# 1NC

## Off-Case

### 1NC

T: USFG

#### Affs should defend hypothetical implementation of antitrust law in alignment with the resolution.

#### “Resolved” requires law

WP 64, (Words and Phrases, 1964, Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### “USFG” means any of the three branches

US Code 88, 42 U.S. Code § 4914, “Development of low-noise-emission products,” <https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/4914>)

(2) The term “Federal Government” includes the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government of the United States, and the government of the District of Columbia.

#### “Core antitrust laws” are the Sherman, Clayon, and FTC Acts

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U.S. antitrust law is defined by federal and state statutes, as interpreted by the courts. The core federal statutes are the Sherman Act,1 passed by Congress in 1890, and the Federal Trade Commission2 and Clayton Acts,3 both passed in 1914. The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) (together the “agencies”) share enforcement of most areas of federal antitrust law but with some differences in the scope of their authority. The FTC has sole authority to enforce Section 5 of FTC Act, which prohibits (1) unfair methods of competition and (2) unfair or deceptive acts or practices. The FTC almost always pursues claims for anticompetitive conduct as unfair methods of competition and reserves charges of unfair or deceptive acts or practices for consumer protection violations. Though the FTC's authority to challenge unfair methods of competition goes beyond conduct prohibited by the Sherman and Clayton Acts, in practice the FTC brings most unfair methods of competition cases under the same standards that courts apply to Sherman Act claims. The most prominent exception is the invitation to collude offense, which falls outside the scope of the Sherman Act (if the invitation is not accepted, there is no agreement). The FTC challenges invitations to collude as so-called “standalone” violations of Section 5.4 The DOJ has sole authority to pursue criminal violations of the antitrust laws. Most states have their own state antitrust and unfair competition statutes. State law follows federal law to some extent, though as discussed below, may differ from federal law in meaningful ways that vary state to state. State attorneys general and private parties can also typically file suit to enforce both federal and state antitrust law.

#### Vote neg:

#### 1---fairness---a limited and predictable topic defines prep and research, while preventing the aff from skirting clash, moving to the fringes, and picking true arguments, which wrecks neg ground; this outweighs because debate’s a game---competition encourages research practices and innovation, which is a prerequisite to participation

#### 2---clash---open subjects cause monopolization of the moral high ground, which denies a role for the neg and prevents second level understanding and turns case

Grossberg 15, Morris Davis Distinguished Professor University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Lawrence Grossberg, 2015, “We All Want to Change the World THE PARADOX OF THE U.S. LEFT A POLEMIC,” <http://www.lwbooks.co.uk/ebooks/we_all_want_to_change_the_world.pdf>)

I will, in the following description, focus on the situation in the human sciences (rather than the hard sciences), where the explosion of publication creates an ever-expanding circle in which there is always too much to read—too many positions, too many arguments, too much contradictory evidence—so that scholars have to rely on either the author's stature or theoretical and/or political agreement. It has become almost impossible to read everything one must read, everything necessary to legitimate, at least in traditional terms, the claim of academic expertise or scholarship. In fact, given this situation (and its consequences as I will describe below), the most surprising thing is how much good work continues to be produced. This situation has serious consequences: First, one's expertise becomes defined in increasingly narrow terms, resulting in the proliferation of sub-fields.9

[footnote 9 beings]

For example, one might point to security studies, surveillance studies, transition studies, game studies, code studies, hip-hop studies, horror studies, etc.

[footnote 9 ends]

And while each of them is valuable for their interdisciplinary efforts around a new empirical field, they all too often act as if the questions (and the realities they interrogate) are new; unfortunately, they rarely say anything new or surprising, anything that has not been said elsewhere. They frequently simply re-discover in their own empirical "pocket" universe what others have said previously in other fields. For example, all sorts of technologically defined sub-fields rediscover the rather old assumption that media audiences are active. This is partly because, within each subfield, one gets the impression of witnessing endless redistributions of a highly circumscribed set of citations and authors, under a series of ever-changing terms to describe their fields or positions. So, academics create ever shrinking circles in which authors cite a few theoretically and politically compatible works, and then follow the footnotes, all of which ultimately lead back to the original authors, creating an endlessly self-referential closed system of citations, a numbingly predictable, circular tissue of references. Second, one is less likely to read work that appears tangential but may nevertheless be absolutely decisive to produc[e]ing truly interesting and insightful research. Asking significant questions should demand that one makes reference to all sorts of concepts and questions which would lead one to follow other unexpected traditions and lines of research, since any investigation (e.g., around questions of participation, publics, or leadership, to use only a few examples that have irked me recently) is likely to open up to an entire history of problematization, of conversations and debates, but who can afford the time and energy anymore. Third, one tends to read only the most recent work since so much is being published—in various media—so rapidly that there is little time to go back and read. Fourth, one tends to select one's sources according to criteria that have more to do with theoretical and political sympathies than with an understanding of research as a conversation with difference. One reads selectively, finding those ideas that are already in line with what one assumes one already knows, and one establishes a body of near-sacred texts; fifth, one selects topics that are au courant, partly because there is less scaffolding that one has to build upon and partly because one's work is more likely to gain visibility and impact. Sixth, complexity goes out the door as one increasingly "sees the world in a grain of sand." One can no longer be satisfied claiming to have discovered merely a new piece of a complex puzzle or even an interesting redeployment of an older practice or structure, because such claims do not bring fame and glory—either to oneself or the university. Instead, one has to have discovered the leading edge, the new key or essence. One good but relatively small idea is expanded into a metonym for the entire economy, culture or society. Instead of seeking new discursive forms to embody complexity, uncertainty and humility, one goes with elegance, hyperbole and the ever receding new.

#### Policy debates over antitrust are valuable

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IV. Antitrust in Civil Society

Competition issues are also part of the general civic discourse separate from the campaign rhetoric and legislative proposals offered by politicians. This is also a significant sign that antitrust has begun to be an important source of small “p” politics that engages substantial segments of the public at large. One example is the increased number of non-technical books intended for a lay audience that deal with the role of antitrust in a healthy economy and democracy. Recent and forthcoming books dealing with these themes include Tim Wu’s “The Curse of Bigness,”109 Matt Stoller’s “Goliath,”110 Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi’s “Competition Overdose,”111 Zephyr Teachout’s “Break ‘em Up,”112 and David Dayan’s “Monopolized.”113 On the academic side, there are a plethora of government and NGO studies of competition policy on digital competition114 and new works are flourishing which explore the broader ramifications of antitrust and competition in society.115 Long form and more mass-market journalism have also taken up the mantle of exploring the role of antitrust and competition policy. Such diverse magazines as The Atlantic,116 Time, 117 New Republic,118 American Prospect,119 Rolling Stone,120 New York Times magazine,121 Variety,122 National Review, 123 Foreign Policy,124 and other policy and opinion magazines have all run recent stories or profiles of individuals involved in antitrust issues. Before the COVID-19 pandemic effectively monopolized press coverage in the United States, there were thirty-three antitrust related stories on the front page of the New York Times or the front page of its business section over a three-month period in late 2019. 125 A majority of the stories focused on tech giants such as Apple, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Facebook.126 In addition, the New York Times also covered stories about mergers, merger policy, local issues such as the Chicago taxi market, and various smaller industries.127 This is separate from coverage during the same period of campaign issues and candidate statements relating to the field. A similar increase in coverage during this same period can be observed anecdotally in more business-oriented publications like Forbes, Barron’s, Wired, and the Wall Street Journal; general newspapers like USA Today, Washington Post, and Huffington Post; more local newspapers; as well as radio and television.128 Web pages and social media accounts on these issues have similarly proliferated on all ideological perspectives.129 Lobbying and public policy groups are growing in number and influence. Beyond the traditional trade associations and general think tanks there are now a number of active groups with antitrust as a large part of their focus. These include the Open Markets Institute, 130 American Antitrust Institute, 131 Anti-Monopoly Fund,132 Institute for Self-Reliance,133 Public Citizen,134 Public Knowledge,135 Demos, 136 and the International Center for Law and Economics.137 At the more technical legal end of the debate, antitrust is similarly flourishing as a field. One sees increased law school hiring in the field for the first time in decades. Academic institutes and centers abound with a wide variety of perspectives ranging from libertarian to enforcement oriented.138 Most major antitrust cases now feature multiple amicus briefs from legal and economic experts on both sides of an issue both in the Supreme Court or the Courts of Appeals.139 Conclusion Antitrust has always been political in nature. Antitrust law provides broad legal commands dealing with how governments and private individuals can challenge different types of market behavior. In this way, antitrust has not changed. Antitrust will never take the place of sports, the Dow Jones index, or the weather for conversation at the breakfast table, but it has become a meaningful part of the political and policy debate for candidates, the legislature, and important segments of civil society. What has changed, however, is the degree that antitrust has reentered the political arena. Once mostly the domain of technocrats, antitrust issues have been proposed and debated by Presidential candidates, political parties, legislators, pundits, journalists, lobby groups, and voters alike. There are also a flurry of serious proposals and investigations that would make significant changes to the current system if adopted. This is all to the good. Even if none of the current proposals come to fruition, the antitrust debate is part of a broader engagement with political economy issues dealing with fundamental concerns such as economic concentration, globalization, income inequality, social and racial justice, and even recently the proper response to the COVID-19 emergency. The many proposals, initiatives, and pressure groups represent at a minimum the return of antitrust as part of the progressive agenda.

## Case

### 1NC---Turn

#### Their lines of flight elaborate a longing for free-form whiteness that can’t be recuperated from its colonial pedigree---elastic freedom preconditions black and indigenous genocide.

King 17, Assistant Professor of Women's, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Georgia State University. (Tiffany, Spring 2017, “Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight”, *Critical Ethnic Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1, pg. 170-172)

Jodi Byrd in particular attends to the colonialist, genocidal, and therefore humanist impulses of the rhizome in her book Transit of Empire.26 What is particularly instructive is the way that Byrd operationalizes her critique of Deleuze and Guattari’s first chapter, “Rhizome,” in their tome A Thousand Plateaus.27 Byrd’s deconstruction, or picking apart, of the poststructuralist and nonsubject- and nonobject-related Deleuzoguattarian rhizomatics are a masterful (and frankly thuggish and rude) demonstration of refusing to adapt or “repair” colonial epistemologies and geographies. Byrd’s refusal is a moment that further helps one distinguish between the works of postcolonial and decolonial studies. Byrd performs an outright refusal that short circuits the colonial and postcolonial comportments of politesse, which allow genocidal Western thought to continue uninterrupted. Byrd’s interrogation of the “colonial nostalgia” latent in poststructural and nonrepresentational forms of thought like Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome is an explicit example of how the violence of white nonrepresentational theory creates an immediate space of impasse for Indigenous, decolonial, Black, and abolitionist intellectual traditions. As Byrd argues, the Deleuzian and Guattarian rhizome assumes its errant, untraceable, and de/reterritorializing path through Native genocide. The rhizome obtains its metaphorical and theoretical elasticity from the discursive genocide of Indigenous peoples. The territory of maneuver or ground that the rhizome gains its bearing on is unwittingly or perhaps indifferently anchored in the disavowal of the Indigenous ancestral claims, history, presence, and ongoing relationship with the land in North America. Deleuze and Guattari covet the free-range and bloody movements in the West, described as a land of “Indians without Ancestry” primarily because they do not have to contend with the presence of Indigenous peoples and their prior relationships (ancestors) to the land and space through which they move and clear as nomads. There are no existing people to which Deleuze and Guattari have to be accountable. Therefore, their own and others’ self-actualizing, free-form whiteness can proceed unimpeded. The rhizomatic West—terra nullius—is without a people, history, or a cosmology to navigate.

Byrd’s reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s reproduction or transit of the “Indian” in their book A Thousand Plateaus limns some of the methods in which colonialism and modes of conquest are enacted on behalf of the self-actualization of white subjects who produce nonrepresentational theory. In fact, Byrd argues that the “Indian is the ontological prior through which poststructuralism functions.”28 Byrd traces the appearance or deployment of the Indian as a simulation or “present absent” in Jacques Derrida’s and then Deleuze and Guattari’s work, which creates space for the white subject and the unending frontier. Byrd also argues that nonrepresentational theory heralded as a liberatory path beyond the subject is colonialist. Byrd indicts Deleuze and Guattari’s use of Leslie Fiedler’s work in order to invoke the American West and the Indian as exceptional cases that inspire rhizomatic movement through the notion of an ever-receding frontier.29 It is colonialist on (at least) two accounts: in its need to render the Indian already and inevitably (ontologically) dead as “it” has no ancestors or living community to whom one needs to be accountable; and in its invocation of the vanishing “Indian,” which opens up the possibility of an “ever-receding frontier” and inspiration for the metaphor of the rhizome. This logic and mode of conquistador thought undergirds the Deleuzian and Guattarian ethos of experimental and rhizomatic lines of flight. Their nonrepresentational theory of lines of flight are only possible as a form of white self-actualizing posthumanism due to the death of Indigenous peoples and their excision from the Earth/land. White posthumanism and its flows and lines of flight are made possible through Native death.

Because of this, Byrd haltingly stops the reader’s momentum as she critiques Deleuzo-guattarian and poststructuralist tendencies that often emerge in postcolonial work. Rather than allow the preemptive rejoinder that white and some postcolonial scholars use, such as “I know that theorist X did not consider race or was racist, but he enables us to do XYZ with his work,”30 Byrd instead cuts off Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizomatics at the path. As Byrd anticipates that following Deleuze and Guattari will end in genocide, she allows the reader the time and space to let this reality sink in and consider a different route than the normative impulse and course of action that is to repair Deleuze and Guattari’s work. Byrd’s work slows us down and brings us to a point of impasse and a resting place where one can slow down, stop, and make a choice to stay put or move forward with the dismissive, whimsical, white conceit that tolerates Native death. Byrd’s refusal allows the reader to feel the violent puncture of the nonrepresentational gash that it tries to disavow. Byrd gives her reader the space and time to say, “Yes, I understand your attempt to evade signification and thus representation but it is not compelling enough for me to overlook the reality that it requires Native genocide.” The way that Byrd’s and others’ decolonial work brings these kinds of tensions and violence to a head enables us to make other kinds of analytic and conceptual choices. The reader is allowed to think and then say, “If this line of thought requires Indigenous death, why even venture down it? What could one possibly repair or salvage of it?”

#### The 1AC’s call to anarchism of thought is a form of humanist masochism which produces a ruse of subjectless-ness---this conceals the desire for white ascendency which undergirds their transgression of the human,- this makes the aff a philic desire to inhabit the bodies of Black and Indigenous people fixed as abject

King 17 (Tiffany Lethabo King, Assistant Professor of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Georgia State, PhD in American Studies from the University of Maryland at College Park, Spring 2017, “Humans Involved: Lurking in the Lines of Posthumanist Flight,” *Critical Ethnic Studies* Volume 3 Number 1) gz

Poststructuralist traditions that attempt to transcend identity actually function as a ruse of subjectlessness. In fact, queer subjectlessness and nonrepresentational rhizomes are an expression of a posthumanism that resuscitates normative subjects through the death of Black and Indigenous peoples. Continental theory has not typically had the stomach for sustaining an investigation of the kind of unspeakable violence that enabled the Marxist worker, queer, and affective subjectless discourses (one can only strive for subjectlessness if you possess it) to exist. The erasure of the (white) body-as-subject-as-ontology has been more effective in covering the bloody trail of white/human-self-actualization than it has been at successfully offering a way around and beyond the entrapments of liberal humanism. According to Amber Jamilla Musser, even in its postidentitarian and subjectless modes, continental theories’ transgressive moves (affective, sensational, masochistic) tend to reinstantiate the white male (sometimes queer) subject that it hopes to overcome.44 While not throwing away affect theory in *Sensational Flesh*, Musser scrutinizes white queer theory’s moves toward subjectless, futurelessnes, and masochism as gestures that actually recover and reify a subject (often white male gay) as they seek to annihilate the subject. Because of this, Musser refuses to read sensations like masochism in an exceptional vein. She explains, “I seek to reinvigorate these other ways of reading masochism, particularly because reading it as exceptional reifies norms of whiteness and masculinity and suppresses other modes of reading power, agency, and experience.”45 As Musser suspects, those who claim a radical subjectless must do so through the abjection of others. Men who claim masochism must become like (or reify) the position of the feminine-as-debased other without a self in order to then occupy this position of subjectlessness. A fixing of an abject position through the (female, Black, Indigenous) body of the other must occur; then, an evacuation of the other’s body must take place in order for the embalming of or supplanting of the body with the white normative male figure. While Musser does not entirely refuse Deleuze and Guattari’s nonrepresentational gesture, she does practice a kind of detached and suspicious read of the forms of violence that can be enacted in white moves beyond the human. Musser treats queer theories’ evangelists of loss and futurelessness, Leo Bersani and Lee Edelman, as nonexceptional and even potentially dangerous to subjects who inhabit the abject spaces that white bourgeois men try to occupy. In the 2015 GLQ roundtable discussion titled “Queer Inhumanisms,” Zakiyyah Iman Jackson reiterated the suspicion that posthumanism is a ruse for white human ascendency. Similar to Musser, Jackson knows that there is often a subject lurking within the bowels or lines of nonrepresentational discourse. Jackson indicts posthumanist calls to move to the “beyond” for reproducing a false and dishonest European transcendentalism. Thus a call for movement in the direction of the “beyond,” issued in a manner that suggests that this call is without location, and therefore with the appearance of incognizance regarding its situated claims and internal limits, returns us to a Eurocentric transcendentalism long challenged.46 Jackson argues that a call for movement beyond always happens from a very specific place. The posthumanist’s horn often blows from a place situated securely within the folds of humanity. This is a very different place than the space of nonbeing from which Black and Indigenous peoples moan, sing, or speak. Native feminist refusal and Black feminist abolitionist skepticism function as intervening comportments, dispositions, and modes of critique that expose the violent and unself-conscious ways that Western theory attempts to move beyond the human through the annihilation of the Other. Because the crafting of the human is a process of relations, specifically the relations of negation, then moving beyond the violence of the human is also a relational process. Transcendence is a relational process of accountability. White subjects cannot transcend identity (e.g., whiteness, queerness), the subject (self-writing and autonomy), or the human (self-actualization) without ending Native genocide and anti- Black racism. Identities, subjects, and the human as they are currently configured come into formation through processes of negation. If there is no plan to enable Black and Indigenous life, then there is no transcending the violence of the human. The scholarship of Native/Indigenous and Black feminists force continental theory to come outside itself and gaze on the way even the various attempts of nonrepresentational theory to annihilate the self actually end up reinventing the subject and the human through new forms of violent invention. This article argues that both refusal and skepticism can work in tandem and interrupt the performance of white innocence through less-than-effective attempts to evade representation that jettison the garb of the human without abolishing the need for Black and Indigenous death.47

### 1NC---AT: Bifo

#### Bifo is wrong about pretty much everything

Lack 19, Professor of Humanities @ Alamo College (Tony, Review of “The Second Coming,” <https://marxandphilosophy.org.uk/reviews/17192_the-second-coming-by-franco-bifo-berardi-reviewed-by-tony-lack/>)

Turning to a few criticisms, Berardi’s text is a loosely-woven collection of insights, many of which have appeared in previous publications. As such, it suffers from a coherent method and structure. Although his rhizomatic approach is suggestive and useful, he often falls back on conventional and unconvincing methods of analysis. He is especially fond of positing inverse relationships similar to those employed by Marx in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, ‘The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces . . .the worker becomes an ever cheaper commodity the more commodities he creates. The devaluation of the world of men is in direct proportion to the increasing value of the world of things.’

Berardi employs the same logic throughout the text, like an hourglass, one part of life fills up in proportion to the other part emptying out. ‘Technological potency has steadily expanded while social consciousness has decreased proportionately’ (12).

Berardi also tends to use anecdotes instead of evidence when it suits his purpose. For example, he claims that two factors responsible for our inability to interpret our way out of the labyrinthine system are sensory overload and a decline in the quality of education. ‘The expansion of the infosphere has forced the acceleration of the mental reaction to info-nervous stimulation. But the critical mind is unable to function in conditions of info-nervous saturation, while the rate of education and the quality of education have fallen and deteriorated’ (19).

Both of these assertions are problematic. Regarding sensory overload, which Berardi refers to as the inability of the ‘psychosphere’ to keep up with the ‘infosphere,’ humans have always been challenged by information rich environments. We adapt quite rapidly to large quantities of stimuli that remain constant in our environment and we learn quickly how to focus our attention on the essential aspects of a complex situation. However, as the demand for screening out information increases we do probably become less empathetic and sensitive, which is one of Berardi’s important points.

Rather than brute information overload, it seems more likely that part of the problem is total absorption. We are like fish who don’t recognize the water, and the water is the ubiquitous complexity of prepackaged social relations expanding in open-ended structures, paths, and networks. The system works so well because the overall feel is not constriction and limitation, but expansive freedom and endless novelty.

The other problem is that it is not clear that we are becoming dumber. This is a form of Golden-Age thinking. Berardi claims that, ‘Idiocy is spreading worldwide as a revolt against the mathematical rationality of financial plundering: a blackout of reason, as revenge does not listen to reason’ (5). Yet the data suggests otherwise. The global literacy rate has increased by 4% every 5 years for the past 65 years, increasing from 42% worldwide in 1960 to 86% in 2015.

On the other hand, if Berardi’s concern about the spread of ‘idiocy’ refers to racism, sexism, xenophobia, and other forms of retrograde thinking, it is unlikely that this is a reaction to the unassailable machinations of the international financial system, as he claims. It seems more likely that our awareness of social injustices, as well as our capacity for empathy has increased, while the phenomena themselves have not become more widespread or barbaric.

Finally, Berardi’s fleeting comments about Taoism and Wu Wei, effortless action, are intriguing, given his description of a system that has no edges and no exterior. However, it is hard to tell what Berardi means because he often falls back on gnostic proclamations such as this when a clearer exposition is in order: ‘The secret is a content hidden from public view. You need the key that enables you to open the safe and you will know the hidden truth’ (100).

The Second Coming obviously refers to Yeats’ poem of the same title. Berardi’s apocalyptic tone and his refusal to offer so much as a glimpse of a better future might make us wonder what rough beast slouches toward us to be born, but that’s about it.

#### Their disavowal of the future results in lifeboat communism, where the privileged retreat into theoretical enclaves insulated from the predatory violence of capitalism and political engagement becomes stifled

Lear 12 — Ben Lear, Viewpoitn Magazine Editor, “Lifeboat Communism – A Review of Franco “Bifo” Berardi’s After the Future,” May 18 2012, <http://viewpointmag.com/2012/05/18/lifeboat-communism-a-review-of-franco-bifo-berardis-after-the-future/>, wcp)

What does the end of the future mean for rad­i­cal pol­i­tics? It is at this point that Bifo’s argu­ment becomes prob­lem­atic. In an argu­ment that inter­sects with groups such as Tiqqun, Bifo argues that we must see “Com­mu­nism as a neces­sity in the col­lapse of cap­i­tal.” Dis­tant from the vol­un­tarism of pre­vi­ous forms of Com­mu­nist pol­i­tics, this “post-growth Com­mu­nism” will be best under­stood as a nec­es­sary response to capital’s refusal of labour. Cut adrift from the “oppor­tu­nity” to work, with wel­fare sys­tems dis­man­tled, Bifo argues that we will wit­ness the pro­lif­er­a­tion of zones of auton­omy respond­ing to the needs of an increas­ingly pre­car­i­ous and super­flu­ous social body. Com­mu­nist pol­i­tics will emerge from an exo­dus, both vol­un­tary and com­pul­sory, from a stag­nat­ing and increas­ingly preda­tory state-capital nexus. This exo­dus is both social, in the devel­op­ment of an alter­na­tive infra­struc­ture, and per­sonal, in the with­drawal from the hyper-stimulation of the semi­otic econ­omy. Bifo aban­dons hope in col­lec­tive con­tes­ta­tion at the level of the political. Bifo’s pol­i­tics could be described as a kind of “lifeboat com­mu­nism.” As the cri­sis rip­ples, mutates, and deep­ens, Bifo sees the role of com­mu­nism as the cre­ation of spaces of sol­i­dar­ity to blunt the worst effects of the cri­sis of social repro­duc­tion. Gone is the demand for a bet­ter world for all, the lib­er­a­tion of our col­lec­tive social wealth, or the unlock­ing of the social poten­tials of tech­nol­ogy. Rather, Bifo’s pol­i­tics are based around insu­lat­ing a nec­es­sar­ily small por­tion of soci­ety from the dic­tates of cap­i­tal. By with­draw­ing from the polit­i­cal sphere, we accept the like­li­hood of los­ing the final scraps of the wel­fare state and con­cede the ter­rain of the polit­i­cal to zom­bie pol­i­tics and preda­tory cap­i­tal. Rather than seek­ing new forms of orga­ni­za­tion to re-enter the polit­i­cal stage, Bifo seems to sug­gest that we seek shel­ter beneath it as best we can. This shy­ing away from the polit­i­cal stage is the weak­ness at the heart of the book. Recent erup­tions of polit­i­cal strug­gle have cap­tured the col­lec­tive imag­i­na­tion because they demon­strate that polit­i­cal con­tes­ta­tion is still pos­si­ble today, in spite of the obsta­cles Bifo has described. The Occupy move­ment and the upris­ings in the Mid­dle East and North Africa have res­onated with all those who still have hope in col­lec­tive strug­gle. Although these move­ments have encoun­tered vary­ing prob­lems, to which we must develop solu­tions, they dis­pel the idea of an unchange­able present. The cur­rent block­ages to suc­cess­ful organ­is­ing have been shown to be *strate­gic and tac­ti­cal*, not ter­mi­nal. Mis­di­ag­nos­ing the cur­rent iner­tia of post-political pub­lic life as a ter­mi­nal con­di­tion leads the left towards an evac­u­a­tion of the polit­i­cal, while we should instead reassert its pri­macy.  If we aban­don any hope of fight­ing in, against, and beyond the exist­ing archi­tec­ture of the state and cap­i­tal, and instead seek refuge in small com­munes, and go-slow prac­tices, we aban­don all real hope of a gen­er­al­ized, or gen­er­al­iz­able, eman­ci­pa­tory pol­i­tics. Although Bifo’s analy­sis of the dif­fi­cul­ties of col­lec­tive action res­onates with all of us who have attempted to orga­nize strug­gles in the past few decades, the pro­posal for a sim­ple with­drawal from cap­i­tal­ism is a bleak pol­i­tics indeed – which, at its most opti­mistic, calls for an orderly default by por­tions of the pro­le­tariat. The hori­zons of com­mu­nist pol­i­tics appear much nar­rower when cap­i­tal­ism is no longer seen as the repos­i­tory of a vast store of social wealth await­ing col­lec­tive redis­tri­b­u­tion, but rather rede­fined as an unas­sail­able site of uni­ver­sal and per­ma­nent aus­ter­ity com­bined with widen­ing social redundancy. It is hard to imag­ine a net­work of self-organized projects and sys­tems sup­port­ing the major­ity of the pop­u­la­tion in the con­text of an increas­ingly preda­tory cap­i­tal­ism. Emerg­ing from the and iso­lated left­ist scenes, this lifeboat com­mu­nism will by its very nature have a lim­ited car­ry­ing capac­ity, as the anar­chist expe­ri­ence in post-Katrina New Orleans attests. The lifeboats that Bifo calls for will undoubt­edly be too small and makeshift to har­bor us all. The cri­sis is twofold. It is a cri­sis of cap­i­tal­ist prof­itabil­ity, and of an increas­ingly pre­car­i­ous and sur­plus global pro­le­tariat whose repro­duc­tion (as both labour and body) is under threat. It is unlikely that the pro­lif­er­a­tion of com­munes, squats, food co-ops, file shar­ers, urban gar­den­ers, and vol­un­tary health ser­vices will bring forth a new, bet­ter world. But while the cur­rent seem­ingly post-political sit­u­a­tion throws up mas­sive obsta­cles to orga­niz­ing, there is still a poten­tial for col­lec­tive con­tes­ta­tion. The cap­i­tal­ist state, racked by its own legit­i­macy cri­sis and weekly polit­i­cal scan­dals, is more vul­ner­a­ble than it appears. We need only recall the period of unex­pected hope built by stu­dents in Britain, occu­piers in Oak­land, and vast swathes of North Africa and the Mid­dle East dur­ing the past two years. These move­ments were mobilised through the betrayal of a vision of the future – but along­side their rage, they put forth a hope which can guide our politics. The task at hand is to unlearn old behav­iour and to forge new tac­ti­cal and organ­i­sa­tional weapons for strug­gle. Bifo’s con­tri­bu­tion is a timely and chal­leng­ing one, but it ulti­mately leads us back towards a DIY cul­ture and “out­reach” pol­i­tics. As our move­ments come to terms with these lim­its, we must also hold onto the belief that lux­ury for all is pos­si­ble. The social poten­tial of unfilled blocks of flats, emerg­ing tech­nolo­gies like 3D-printing, and the desires of the mil­lions of under­em­ployed, should remind us of this. This will not be pos­si­ble with­out a col­lec­tive strug­gle against the state and the demands of cap­i­tal, one which simul­ta­ne­ously defends what we have and attempts to move beyond it. A retreat to lifeboat pol­i­tics is both pre­ma­ture and a self-fulfilling prophecy. While Bifo cor­rectly analy­ses the cur­rent con­junc­ture – clearly iden­ti­fy­ing the post-political state, the weak­ness of the Left, the cri­sis of prof­itabil­ity and new forms of labour, and their impact on the sub­ject – his polit­i­cal pre­scrip­tions lead us in the wrong direc­tion. Just as Bifo does, we place the strug­gle against work at the cen­ter; but we can also seek to lib­er­ate social wealth, rather than insu­late a lucky few from the rav­ages of cap­i­tal. Rather than “No Future,” we must raise a dif­fer­ent ban­ner: “The future’s here, it just needs reorganizing.”

### 1NC---Turn

#### Antitrust is good---two impacts:

#### 1---Health consolidation spikes health care costs and drastically lowers quality of care---antitrust is reverse causal

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Covid-19 has initiated yet another wave: A wave of hospital mergers and acquisitions that will have devastating consequences for public health if industry doesn’t soon execute an about-face. Whether because they’re on the brink of bankruptcy and have subscribed to the half-truth that size is protective, or because they think they can score some good deals and believe scale and success are synonymous, the financial fallout of Covid-19 has caused many hospital executives to make consolidation a core part of their future plans. With the intent of increasing care quality and decreasing consumer costs despite these challenging times, the merger between Shannon Medical Center and Community Hospital and partnership between Intermountain and Sanford Health are just two examples. There are multiple reasons why consumers absolutely cannot afford for industry to bulk up in an effort to weather this storm. The first is that the positive efforts executives claim consolidation will help them accomplish often prove to be futile. Research shows that wherever market concentration is high, there are also higher prices for both consumers and the employers who provide their healthcare coverage. In the absence of competition, costs increase and quality deteriorates. That’s the opposite of progress. Second, generally speaking, the union of two institutions with operational shortcomings only creates one larger institution with even more operational shortcomings! That’s not progress either. Third, Covid-induced consolidation will only make future progress many times more difficult. The larger an organization is, the more it will struggle to rapidly adapt to healthcare disruptions like we’re seeing today. Retail giants like Walmart, Walgreens, Amazon and CVS are pivoting to cater to healthcare consumer demands for affordability and accessibility. Right now, they’re still a blip on the radar relative to mainstream healthcare delivery, but they are looking to eventually corner the market and drive the industry forward. And as they continue down this path, consolidated healthcare systems will be left behind, potentially at the expense of the consumers in that area. The potential impact of continued consolidation on rural patients is especially concerning. Rural communities may have a limited number of the big-box retailers mentioned above. And the unfortunate fact of the matter is that when a larger hospital or health system purchases a smaller, rural hospital, it’s usually only a matter of time before the purchasing system realizes that unless they drastically pare down and reconfigure operations, the acquired hospital will never be profitable. Many eventually decide to close up shop, in some instances reducing or even eliminating rural patients’ options for care delivery. In the absolute worst-case scenario, this is exactly the reality all consumers could face if consolidation continues at its current pace. In theory and if left unchecked, all of the hospitals in the United States could be owned by only a handful of mammoth systems that then lack incentive to continually deliver quality services at lower total cost of care.

#### Health care antitrust is a premier vehicle for social change and solves the disproportionate racial impact of rising health costs.

Kritter 21, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, (Dani, March 2021, “Antitrust as Antiracist”, <https://www.californialawreview.org/antitrust-as-antiracist/>)

The [federal antitrust laws](https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws)—three statutes enacted over a century ago—are in the spotlight. The year 2020 brought a [new reckoning with corporate power](https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/dec/18/google-facebook-antitrust-lawsuits-big-tech) and a [resurgent interest in using antitrust law](https://newrepublic.com/article/160646/biden-antitrust-blueprint-monopoly-busting) as a force for populist change. The “hipster antitrust” movement argues that the focus of antitrust policy should not be limited to market power and consumer welfare. Rather, antitrust can and should be a remedy for a suite of societal ills, from workers’ rights to campaign finance and income inequality. The year 2020 also marked an awakening to [racial injustice](https://news.berkeley.edu/2020/09/22/racial-justice-in-america-a-deeper-look/) in America. The deaths of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Ahmaud Arbery sparked nationwide outrage and demands to reform institutions built on systemic racism. Yet the recent plans for [antitrust reform](https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/117th-congress-takes-early-steps-6904745/)—which primarily focus on monopolies in tech—ignore the fact that the antitrust status quo perpetuates [racial injustice](https://theappeal.org/how-antitrust-perpetuates-structural-racism/). But it doesn’t have to be this way. This blog identifies consolidation in healthcare and vertical restraints in franchising as two examples of how lax antitrust enforcement has disproportionately harmed people of color. It also argues that by dusting off existing antitrust tools, antitrust enforcement can be [antiracist](https://nmaahc.si.edu/learn/talking-about-race/topics/being-antiracist). Background: The Antitrust Toolbox Congress enacted the federal antitrust laws to check the power of massive corporations run amuck. These laws—the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, and the Clayton Act—were originally designed to control corporate power, protect individual economic freedom, and ensure a fair and equal society. But beginning in the 1970s when Robert Bork published the still-influential “[Antitrust Paradox](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2012/12/20/antitrust-was-defined-by-robert-bork-i-cannot-overstate-his-influence/),” courts slowly narrowed the focus of antitrust law to protecting consumer welfare. Today, antitrust enforcement prioritizes preventing the anticompetitive acquisition, exercise, or maintenance of market power that threatens consumer welfare and competition—a much narrower goal than its populist origins. Dusting Off the Tools Recent years have seen [bipartisan](https://www.axios.com/exclusive-poll-shows-bipartisan-support-for-tech-antitrust-action-c3794ff5-120d-44d8-bac1-58b033efbd8a.html) interest in reining in powerful corporations with more aggressive antitrust enforcement. One of the few agency voices calling for an antiracist approach to antitrust is Rebecca Slaughter, the acting chair of the FTC. Slaughter [has recently spoken out](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1583714/slaughter_remarks_at_gcr_interactive_women_in_antitrust.pdf) about using antitrust enforcement to “right the wrongs of systemic racism.” She challenges what she views to be a faulty premise of antitrust law: “that antitrust can and should be value-neutral, and therefore social justice problems like racism do not have a role in antitrust enforcement.” Slaughter argues that antitrust has never been and never will be value-neutral. Antitrust addresses market structures, and racism is entrenched in the historic and current market structures in the United States. When agencies make decisions about how to deploy antitrust tools, they can choose whether to reinforce these structural inequities or to dismantle them. Healthcare and franchising are two examples of how a shift in antitrust enforcement from “value-neutral” to antiracist can break down market structures that perpetuate racial injustice. Honing in on Healthcare Monopolies Consolidation in the healthcare industry is a driving force behind the sky-high cost of medical care and pharmaceutical drugs. Due to a wave of healthcare mergers, most hospital markets in the United States are dominated by a single corporate entity. The lack of competition means the dominant hospital is free to exercise market power by raising prices and restricting output. [Recent studies](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/health/covid-hospitals-medicare-rates.html) of prices for hospital and outpatient treatment report that healthcare mergers have resulted in large networks charging private insurers 2.5 to 3 times more than Medicare rates for the same patient care. These rising costs lead to higher insurance premiums paid by employers and individuals. Artificially inflated healthcare costs disproportionately burden people of color and create a barrier to accessing quality care. Black families spend a greater share of their household income on health care premiums and out-of-pocket costs than the average American family. And of the thirty million [uninsured](https://www.brookings.edu/blog/usc-brookings-schaeffer-on-health-policy/2020/02/19/there-are-clear-race-based-inequalities-in-health-insurance-and-health-outcomes/) individuals in the United States, half are people of color. The [COVID-19 pandemic](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/health-equity/racial-ethnic-disparities/index.html) has put this health inequity in sharp focus: racial and ethnic minority groups are more likely to contract the virus, get severely ill, and die from coronavirus infections. What can antitrust do? First, antitrust merger review can be antiracist. Mergers between competitors are scrutinized under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers that may substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly. When determining whether a merger lessens competition, the FTC, Department of Justice (DOJ), and courts consider the likelihood of anticompetitive effects. An antiracist application of the Clayton Act would consider racially disparate outcomes like health care costs, insurance premiums, and the quality of care provided as anticompetitive effects. Business practices that perpetuate systemic racism are anticompetitive because they exclude people of color from full participation in the market. And this exclusion is expensive: a study by Citigroup estimates that discrimination cost the U.S. economy [$16 trillion](https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020/09/23/916022472/cost-of-racism-u-s-economy-lost-16-trillion-because-of-discrimination-bank-says) since 2000. Moreover, there is precedent for applying a broad conception of anticompetitive effects in merger review. In [Brown Shoe Co. Inc. v. United States](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/20/technology/tech-giants-antitrust-law.html), the Supreme Court held that a meager 7.2 percent combined market share of two merging shoe manufacturers was unhealthy market concentration under the Clayton Act. Chief Justice Earl Warren acknowledged that concentration in the shoe industry might offer some efficiencies and lower prices for consumers, but “the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses” was a priority. Therefore, agencies can and should argue that mergers that reinforce racial inequity substantially lessen competition. Second, antitrust enforcement actions can hone in on industries like healthcare where the anticompetitive effects are acutely felt by people of color. As California attorney general from 2011 to 2017, [Vice President Kamala Harris](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/06/health/kamala-harris-health-care.html) prioritized taking on healthcare prices through antitrust. Her investigation laid the groundwork for California’s suit against [Sutter Health](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/03/health/sutter-hospitals-medical-bills.html) for using its market power to raise prices and extort better deals from insurers, which resulted in a $575 million settlement. The DOJ and FTC should follow in California and Vice President Harris’s footsteps and crack down on healthcare, utilizing an antiracist approach.

#### 2---The disappearance of antitrust law from public discourse has cemented corporate power.

David Dayen 15, author of *Monopolized: Life in the Age of Corporate Power (2020)* and *Chain of Title: How Three Ordinary Americans Uncovered Wall Street's Great Foreclosure Fraud*, “Bring Back Antitrust,” The American Prospect, Vol. 26, No. 4, Fall 2015, lexis.

In 1964, historian Richard Hofstadter gave a speech at the University of California, Berkeley, titled "What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?" He wondered why anti-monopoly sentiment ceased to become the subject of public agitation. "Once the United States had an antitrust movement without antitrust prosecutions," Hofstadter said. "In our time, there have been antitrust prosecutions without an antitrust movement."

Now we have lost both the movement and the prosecutions. When we talk about banks that are too big to fail, we're talking about antitrust. When we talk about the high cost of health care, we're talking about antitrust. So many of our key domestic issues are fundamentally questions about whether we should tolerate monopolies, or dismantle them. But this formulation-a centerpiece of public debate in the last robberbaron era between the 1880s and 1910s-has all but disappeared from popular discourse.

Can anti-monopoly sentiment be revived? When New York's Working Families Party first recruited Zephyr Teachout to run for governor, she said she would only do it if she could talk about monopolies. "They polled it, and they were correct that nobody knew what I was talking about," Teachout says. But when she eventually ran an insurgent campaign against incumbent Andrew Cuomo, she was determined to talk about it anyway.

"The minute you got past the sound-bite level, people responded to the concentration of power," Teachout says. They did campaign events at places where people paid their cable bills, using the pending Comcast-Time Warner merger, eventually abandoned, as the hook. She engaged farmers in upstate New York about monopsony power, and discussed Amazon and big banks on the stump. And it resonated. After only one month of campaigning, Teachout won 35 percent of the vote, with particular strength in upstate counties where farming issues were prominent.

"The Tea Party talks to people and says, 'You're out of power because government is taking it away from you,"' Teachout says. "Far too often, Democrats say, 'You're wrong, you're not out of power.' That's dissonant with our lived experience. You're out of power ... because your priorities don't matter and JPMorgan's do."

Beyond Teachout, you can see through the haze the stirrings of a grassroots antitrust agenda. The greatest anti-monopoly victory of the modern age, the Federal Communications Commission's net-neutrality rules, owed much to a smart, tech-savvy movement that leveraged big protest platforms. Web-native activists fought for the decentralized power of the Internet, without gatekeepers collecting tolls along the way. And they made the connection to things like the Comcast-Time Warner merger, which failed amid public outcry.

"After this existential threat to the Web, you see the same groups becoming interested in the deep history of anti-monopoly laws," Teachout says. "It's kind of an exciting intellectual moment, a fusion between old-school farmers who have been complaining for 30 years and new net-neutrality dreamers."

Monopolists have long used technological advances to consolidate power, from Gilded Age tycoons leveraging control of railroads and telegraphs to Amazon using its first-mover status in e-commerce to squeeze book producers, or Google harvesting traffic to their market-leading search engine to serve ads. It's easy to translate the need for a neutral platform for websites into the same need for book sales or car ride-sharing.

The European Union, in fact, did file formal antitrust charges against Google, accusing it of forcing search engine users into its own shopping platforms, and bundling Android phones with their own apps, to prevent competitors from performing the same functions. The FTC shut down its own investigation into Google over the same concerns in 2013. But an inadvertent disclosure revealed that the agency's Bureau of Competition recommended bringing a lawsuit, arguing that Google's conduct "has resulted-and will result-in real harm to consumers and to innovation in the online search and advertising markets." The political leadership ignored the recommendation.

The next administration must show "leadership that has a certain intellectual curiosity," says Maurice Stucke, pointing to the Google case as a missed opportunity. An alteration in posture would make enforcement far more vigorous, and bringing more cases will give litigators more experience and confidence to negotiate the judicial barriers. The American Antitrust Institute plans to create a transition document for the incoming administration, as they did for the Obama transition.

But at a time of political disempowerment, teaching about the dangers of monopolies and how we have the laws on the books to fight them, and creating upward pressure to do it, offers great potential for a paradigm shift. Connecting Senator Elizabeth Warren's fight against a rigged financial system and Al Franken's fight against media concentration can spark broader political energy.

You could see this potential in Washington, D.C., where in August, the city's Public Service Commission rejected a merger between energy firms Exelon and Pepco, citing "more active participation by parties and interested persons than any other proceeding in the Commission's more than a century of operations." Activists argued a giant Exelon conglomerate would fail to devote resources to the city's clean-energy goals, connecting anti-monopolization with fighting climate change.

There are a lot of reasons for runaway monopolies: an intellectual hijacking by Chicago-school conservative economists, the over-financialization of the economy, a failure of federal antitrust enforcement. But perhaps the biggest reason is that antitrust policy has become divorced from politics, confined to specialized lawyers and mathematicians instead of citizens and activists. Without grassroots momentum, politicians and enforcement agencies can safely ignore the issue. That's the challenge for a small band of academics, think-tank fellows, and activists: to make monopolies a vital issue again, connecting with the severe economic anxiety Americans feel.

### 1NC---Turn

#### COVID-19 proves capitalism is financially sustainable---no structural collapse.

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Why the U.S. Is Unlikely to be Headed Towards a Structural Regime Break

Though the path from the crisis we’re in now to either depression or debt crisis is not impossible, it’s not easy or natural, if we examine each of the four paths in regards to the current situation:

Policy Error — The policy challenge of coronavirus is enormous, but what is on display is the opposite of the inaction of the Great Depression. On the monetary side, the first signs of stress in the banking system — in the repo and commercial paper markets — were met with timely and sizable monetary policy action. On the fiscal side, it didn’t take long — certainly by Washington standards — to pass the $2 trillion CARES Act to provide funds to counteract the wave of liquidity and capital problems for the real economy (households and firms). Beyond any specific policy action, we are seeing a mindset in which policy makers will keep throwing policy innovations at the problem until something sticks — quite the opposite of the 1930s.

Political Willingness — It certainly is possible that political calculus gets in the way of averting a structural breakdown, but not very plausible because the political costs are high. To be sure there are two risks involved: 1) The unwillingness to craft a piece of legislation, perhaps because of differences in analysis, beliefs, or dogma; and 2) the failure to pass legislation because one side sees greater political gain in obstruction. While the TARP fiasco reminds us that both risks are real and shouldn’t be dismissed, crises tend to lubricate deal making, and the costs of political obstruction are particularly high, even in a hyper-partisan election year.

Policy Dependence — This path is not applicable in the U.S. because of monetary sovereignty. The Federal Reserve will always facilitate fiscal policy in a time of low and stable inflation and a healthy currency.

Policy Rejection — A debt crisis seems improbable for the U.S.: Inflation expectations are very well anchored (and, if anything, too low). The rate-risk correlation is very solid, where in risk-off periods (moment when investors are less tolerant of risk and prices of risk assets like stocks fall) bond prices rally (yields fall). The USD reserve currency status is deeply entrenched as the rest of the world needs to hold U.S. safe assets (and don’t wish to see their currencies appreciate). And nominal interest rates are generally lower than nominal growth (r – g < 0). All of these factors make for favorable financing conditions. Can coronavirus damage all that and deliver a crisis where markets refuse to purchase U.S. debt? It’s possible, but very implausible, and it would be a long and painful process. A break in the inflation regime plays out over several years.

#### Their sustainability evidence is too old and about Trumpism which Biden shows the status quo is resilient to

#### Transition is impossible.

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‘Locked’ into growth and rising wellbeing expectations? Having set out in the previous sections the discussion about wellbeing in the degrowth discourse so far, we now examine two additional wellbeing related challenges to the political feasibility of degrowth. First, it can be argued that the dominance of growth-based economics has taken on a ‘structural’ quality in current societies. This means that a transition to degrowth that can successfully support wellbeing would need to involve very fundamental social, economic, political, cultural and technological changes – some of which are difficult to achieve through political means. Second, these changes would ideally need to happen very fast, to present a meaningful response to the climate change crisis. We argue here that the process of transition itself is likely to bring about challenges for achieving aspired wellbeing outcomes. Third, and based on the argument that the framework of universal basic needs is most appropriate for discussing wellbeing in a degrowth context, we raise the question how well (or not) applying this framework to think about wellbeing aligns with current societies’ wellbeing expectations. 3.1. Growth ‘lock in’ Economic growth, as an attribute of market capitalism, has structural properties – it is needed to stabilise modern societies as it provides employment, public sector provision through tax revenues, rising wages, and hence social stability ([Petridis et al., 2015: 178](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0375), [Rosa et al., 2017](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0405)). Economic growth is organised around and shapes a range of tightly coupled structures, including institutions, norms, discourses, culture, technologies, competences, identities, etc. Historically speaking, growth is a fairly recent phenomenon which only picked up in the 19th century together with the industrialisation of Western economies. In a co-evolutionary process, a range of institutions developed which are now coupled to a growth-based capitalist economy, including the nation state, representative democracy, the rule of law and current legal, financial, labour market, education, research, and welfare systems. These are based on philosophies which emerged to justify and give meaning to these institutions, for instance on individualism, freedom, justice, sovereignty, or power. The embeddedness of the growth-based capitalistic economic system in these co-evolved institutions and ways of thinking makes it difficult to transition to a degrowth system because the change of the economic system would need to involve a parallel transformation of those coupled systems. In Luhmann’s words, the constitution of the current system “defuturises” ([Luhmann, 1976: 141](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0305)) the future, it reduces the “openness” of the future; “path dependency” or even “lock-in” are related expressions that capture this idea. Two examples which directly link to people’s wellbeing can illustrate this point: the relationship between welfare states and growth, and between growth and people’s mind-sets and identities. The satisfaction of needs is influenced by the character of socio-economic institutions, including the ways in which work, welfare, retirement, health, education and family life are governed; as well as by the structure of the distribution of a range of resources that support health and wellbeing. Welfare state institutions play an important role in these areas in high income economies, and they are closely coupled with economic growth ([Bailey, 2015](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0015)). Rising economic prosperity in the post Second World War period provided the resources for establishing welfare states in Europe and elsewhere, and the funding of current welfare state institutions is closely coupled to economic growth as it largely depends on income-related taxes and [social security contributions](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/social-security-contributions). The positive relationship between economic growth and welfare states in many ways also works the other way round: welfare states support growth by enhancing the population’s health and education levels, providing unemployment and minimum income benefits for people out of work. This helps to increase productivity, maintain consumer demand, and more generally contain and minimise social conflict through redistribution and institutionalised conflict resolution between employers and employees. Evidently, a fundamental [reorganisation](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/reorganization) of the economic and welfare system would be required under degrowth to sustain investments in health, education, and the reduction of poverty and [inequality](https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/inequality). This will be crucial in a context of decreasing material and financial resources, because if left unmanaged, this could provide fertile ground for new social conflicts with potentially detrimental implications for wellbeing. Various degrowth authors have made suggestions for alternative welfare institutions and policies, including working time reduction and redistribution as mentioned above ([Victor & Rosenbluth, 2007](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0460)), a basic income ([Gorz, 1980](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0190); [Dietz & O’Neill, 2013: 94](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0110)), and, from a Marxian perspective, the establishment of a cooperative economy in which businesses will be worker-owned and managed ([Blauwhof, 2012](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0020)). These are all relevant suggestions, however, it should not be underestimated how radical the changes to existing social systems are that these new institutions represent. They challenge deeply entrenched ways of thinking about rights, justice, freedom, private property, individual responsibility, etc. A change of these deeply rooted ‘logics’ on which these institutions are based is not impossible, but very difficult to steer with political means. This point closely links to the idea that economic growth is not only at the core of various socio-economic institutions but is also very deeply anchored in people’s minds, bodies and identities which is likely to make the transition to degrowth additionally challenging. The concept of social practices helps us understand the ways in which agents (and their mind-sets and bodies) and broader social structures are continuously implicated and reproduced in the performance of social life ([Büchs & Koch, 2017: ch. 6](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0060)). From this perspective, economic growth is not just an external premise that actors can decide to act upon or not, but it is a principle with structural properties that is engrained in ways of thinking and acting – for the most part habitually. Growth thus becomes something that is perceived as ‘natural’ by the vast majority of actors. A range of scholars have argued that the growth paradigm is deeply embedded in people’s minds and bodies ([Göpel, 2016](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0185); [Lane, 1991](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0285); [Welzer, 2011](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0475); [Büchs & Koch, 2017: ch. 6](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715#bib0060)). This implies that people’s identities and life goals are closely aligned with the idea of growth – shaped by ideas of social progress, personal status and success through careers, rising income and consumption. Even seemingly alternative goals such as ‘personal fulfilment’ can be infused with ideas that remain tied to the growth paradigm, for instance if fulfilment is sought through high consumption and high emissions practices such as extensive long haul travel or expensive hobbies and gadgets. As [Meadows (1999)](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328718300715" \l "bib0325) has pointed out, the most effective, but also the most difficult step in system transformation is the shift of paradigms that underpin the system. Again, since this is difficult to influence politically, it presents a major hurdle for a departure from growth-based systems that also maintains wellbeing.

#### Antitrust is key to sustainability.

Rebecca M. Henderson 20, Harvard’s John and Natty McArthur University Professor, based at Harvard Business School, and a research fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research, “Reimagining Capitalism in the Shadow of the Pandemic,” Harvard Business Review, 7/28/2020, https://hbr.org/2020/07/reimagining-capitalism-in-the-shadow-of-the-pandemic, kyujin

The Pandemic’s Challenges — and Opportunities Capitalism is one of the great inventions of the human race — an unparalleled source of prosperity, opportunity and innovation. We won’t solve the problems that we face without it. To solve inequality, we need good jobs — and lots of them. To solve climate change, we need (among other things) to transform the world’s energy, transportation, and agricultural systems. Only the relentless pressure of the free market can drive this kind of transformative innovation at scale. In this context, the pandemic is both a massive challenge and an opportunity. A challenge because more than a half a million people have died, the global economy has been massively disrupted, and tens of millions of people have lost their jobs. A challenge because the combination of deep economic disadvantage — at the beginning of May nearly 61% percent of Hispanic and 44% of Black households had experienced a job or wage loss due to the corona virus, for example, compared with 38% percent of whites — and the killings of George Floyd, Ahmaud Arbery, Breona Taylor and countless others have brought anger and calls for justice to our streets. The world will almost certainly be poorer, more divided, and more fearful in 2021 than it was in 2019. It’s an opportunity because it has also shown us so vividly what is wrong. Inequality is no longer simply an abstract idea. It’s a reality that many “essential” workers must show up even when they’re sick because they have no savings and no paid leave. That racism is not something that was solved by the civil rights movement. As the skies clear and early research suggests that the reduction in fossil fuel pollution is saving lives, the costs of continuing to rely on dirty energy have become much more tangible. Watching states bid against each other for vital medical equipment while the federal government fumbles its response to the virus has made the reality of our broken politics very clear. The pandemic has reminded us that we stand and fall as a society and that the welfare of the poorest among us is integral to everyone’s welfare. It has shown us that planning for the future is essential and that, when the chips are down, a capable, responsive government is a necessity, not a dirty word. We’ve learned that when we must do something, we can: Fundamental change no longer seems impossibly out of the reach. We can do better. We already have the resources and the knowledge we need to build a more equitable, sustainable capitalism. But to get there, business will have to change how it understands its role in the world (and in the U.S. in particular) — and how it thinks about government. A New Path Forward While free markets are an unparalleled source of prosperity and freedom, the free market can only take us where we need to go if externalities such as carbon pollution are properly priced, if there is genuine freedom of opportunity, and if the rules of the game are such that competition is free and fair. Markets do not police themselves; they must be balanced by transparent, capable, democratically accountable governments. Today — in large part due to the rise of shareholder primacy, the increasing role of money in politics, and the systematic attack on government as a necessary or effective institution — that balance is largely absent. As a result, one of the fastest routes to profitability is often to persuade politicians to write the rules in your favor. Firms feel free to dump greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, for example, while spending hundreds of millions of dollars to lobby against carbon regulation. We’re even seeing this dynamic in the U.S. government’s response to the pandemic: It’s increasingly clear that an uncomfortably large share of the benefits from the recent stimulus has gone to very large firms and to very wealthy individuals. I’m not suggesting that firms neglect their duty to their shareholders. Focusing on profitability is essential if a company is to thrive in today’s brutally competitive market. But profit maximization has always been a means to an end, justified by the idea that when markets are genuinely free and fair, there’s good reason to believe they lead to both prosperity and freedom. But when markets are no longer held in check by governments that can police the rules of the game, appropriately control externalities, or provide the public goods necessary to support real opportunity, they become too powerful for their own good. The chaotic and uneven pandemic response we are experiencing today flows directly from 30 years of treating government as something that should be “drowned in the bathtub.” Now more than ever, I believe firms have not just a moral duty to contribute to the health of the institutions that keep our society strong and our capitalism genuinely free and genuinely fair, but also an economic interest in doing so. We need to rebuild our democracy, strengthen our public conversation so that it’s firmly based on facts and mutual respect, commit with everything we have to building an inclusive society for everyone, and yes, find ways to rediscover the importance of democratically accountable, capable, responsive government. Why? We cannot decarbonize the world’s energy supply without government regulating fossil fuel emissions and providing positive incentives to embrace low carbon solutions. Yes, individual firms can provide better jobs — paying employees a decent wage and providing ongoing training, among other necessary steps — but we’ll only successfully address inequality and racism at scale through structural reform, if we can do things like: provide quality education and health care to everyone, no matter their parents’ income; raise the minimum wage; and find ways to give employees more power as they negotiate with increasingly powerful firms. Most fundamentally, we’ll only rebuild trust in the political system, and with it a government that is genuinely responsive to ordinary people, if we can get money out of politics and stop tolerating business’s attacks on government. These attacks are often framed in terms of defending the free market, but too often are simply attempts to block the action we need to build a more equitable society. Collective action — a sustained effort by coalitions of firms — could make a huge difference in helping to drive this kind of institutional change. Firms are already working together to solve some of the world’s toughest problems. A third of the world’s invested capital is already committed to insisting that the firms in their portfolios plan for the challenge of climate change. Businesses across the world are increasingly coming to realize that democratically accountable, freely elected, capable governments are critical to long term economic health — and are willing to say so in public. But they need to do more. A “Kodak Moment” for the World I can feel your skepticism as I write. Can business really change — and help government change along with it? Can it embrace a version of capitalism that focuses on the longer term and the common good? Can it help to rebuild the power of the very institutions that are needed to keep it in check? I believe it can. We already know that it is possible to make money by addressing the world’s social and environmental problems. Walmart saved a billion dollars in fuel costs by increasing the efficiency of their trucking fleet. Elon Musk has revolutionized the automotive business and built a company worth more than GM and Ford combined in the process. The most successful $200M+ IPO of the last 20 years was a company that promised to replace beef with a burger made largely from soy. At Unilever, so called “purpose-driven” brands are growing 69% faster than the rest of the portfolio as consumers increasingly vote with their wallets. Change on a broader scale will be much harder. But not impossible. Think of this as a “Kodak moment” for the world. I spent the first 20 years of my career at MIT as a professor of innovation and strategy. For much of it I was quite literally the Eastman Kodak professor of management. My title was a coincidence — but a deeply ironic one, since I spent most of my time trying to understand why large, successful firms like Kodak had so much trouble responding effectively when the world around them changed. By now the company’s story is well-known: Kodak was once one of the world’s most successful firms. The firm invented classic film-based commercial photography and used it to build one of the world’s most iconic brands. As one senior vice president and director of Kodak research noted in a 1985 Wall Street Journal article, “We’re moving into an information-based company…[but] it’s very hard to find anything [with profit margins] like color photography that is legal.” But Kodak went bankrupt in 2012, having failed to master the transition to digital photography. The business community now faces a similar transition. As the Business Roundtable’s historic decision last year to “lead their companies for the benefits of all stakeholders” suggested, the vast majority of the world’s leading firms know that we must tackle the challenge of climate change, that we must find a way to ensure that everyone has a chance to share in the world’s wealth, and that it’s vital that we not let democracy lose out to either oligarchy or tyranny. We know that we need to change. But too often it’s tempting to emulate Kodak, claiming that change will come — but not now. Insisting that it’s more profitable to stick with the old ways, that if it’s really important we’ll get around to doing something new — later. Change is hard. It’s not surprising that we’re struggling to adopt new ways of thinking about the world and business’s role in it. But I am hopeful. Not optimistic, in the sense that I’m sure everything will work out just fine — I’m not sure of that at all. But hopeful. As a species, we have a gift for problem solving. Kodak failed to manage the digital transition, but Nikon, Canon and Fujifilm continue to be billion-dollar companies. Thousands of firms and millions of people are even now exploring ways to solve our common problems — for example, firms are partnering with each other and with governments to search for vaccines and to bring people back to work safely. This kind of cooperation must continue beyond the pandemic. As recent data shows, trust in business has fallen during the pandemic, but trust in government has risen dramatically. There is no better time for business to see government as a partner, not an adversary, in helping to make society work everyone — not just the lucky few. We can learn from the horrors of the pandemic. We must. We don’t need to go back to “normal” — we need to reimagine capitalism instead. We need to find a way to balance the energy of the free market with the power of competent, responsive government. Together, they can help us build a more just and sustainable world.

#### Three cap good impacts:

#### 1---Globalization is immensely beneficial for improving quality of life in the Global South---it’s also widely supported which proves their epistemic skepticism is from an ivory tower.

Horner et al. 18 (Rory, Global Development Institute, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK, “Globalisation, uneven development and the North–South ‘big switch’,” Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society 2018, 11, 17–33 doi:10.1093/cjres/rsx026)

Citizen surveys further reveal dramatic changes in attitudes to globalisation across and within the global North and South. While such surveys have methodological limitations,1 the results indicate distinctive trends that support the thesis of the ‘big switch’. Among people in the global South, polls have consistently found quite positive attitudes towards globalisation. In 2007, the Times of India claimed that ‘Indians believe globalisation benefits their country’, citing a poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and World Public Opinion that 54% of Indians answered ‘good’ compared to 30% ‘bad’ to the question of whether increasing economic connections ‘with others around the world is mostly good or bad’. More recently, Stokes (2016) reported on Pew Research Surveys from 2016 which found that 60% of Chinese think their country’s involvement in the global economy is good (compared to 23% who think it is bad), while 52% of Indians surveyed thought it was good compared to 25% who said it was a problem. A recent YouGov survey of 20,000 people across 19 countries found a majority believed that globalisation has been a force for good. That survey found the most enthusiasm for globalisation in East and South-East Asia, where over 70% in all countries believed it has been a force for good. The highest approval, 91%, was in Vietnam, a relative latecomer to globalisation (Smith, 2017).

By contrast, public support for globalisation in the global North has plummeted. Bhagwati (2004) cited an Environics International Survey presented at the 2002 World Economic Forum Meetings to argue that disillusionment with globalisation was not universal; ‘anti-globalisation sentiments are more prevalent in the rich countries of the North, while pluralities of policy makers and the public in the poor countries of the South see globalisation instead as a positive force’ (2004, 8). Although Bhagwati suggested this was an ‘ironic reversal’, it proved to be in line with a 2007 BBC World Service poll that found 57% of people in G7 countries thought the pace of globalisation was too rapid, whereas the majority of those in ~~developing~~ countries surveyed thought it was just right or too slow (e.g. IMF, 2008; Pieterse, 2012). A 2007 Pew Global Poll similarly found a decline in the percentage of people in many Northern countries who believed trade had a positive impact. In its analysis of the survey results, Kohut and Wilke (2008, 6–7) commented that ‘it is in economically stagnant Western countries that we see the most trepidation about globalisation’. Almost 10 years later, The Economist (2016) reported on a YouGov survey of 19 countries, which found that fewer than half of people in the USA, UK and France believed that globalisation is a ‘force for good’ in the world. This broad change in attitude toward globalisation is playing out in national electoral politics as well as gatherings such as the World Economic Forum and the meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.

The ‘big switch’ and the geography of uneven development

The ‘big switch’ seemingly confounds the predictions of the most vocal proponents and critics of globalisation alike. Uneven development is dynamic and relates to differences both within and among countries (Sheppard, 2016). Naïve claims that the world is flat or that economic globalisation is ‘win-win’ have rightly been dismissed (Baldwin, 2016; Christopherson et al., 2008; Turok et al., 2017), yet it is also insufficient to suggest that globalisation simply leads to a reproduction of existing inequalities, overlooking how that unevenness may be changing as a result of new macroeconomic geographies (Peck, 2016). While trade theory could predict that there would be ‘losers’ in the global North from international economic integration, proponents of economic globalisation have asserted that they would be few in number and could be compensated. More recently, it appears that a large group of people feel more forsaken than compensated. Similarly, for those who embraced Marxian political economy, and warned of its negative consequences in the South, the apparent optimism and support for globalisation in the South may have been unexpected. The sceptical internationalists (e.g. Evans, 2008; Kaplinsky, 2001; Stiglitz, 2006) should be acknowledged, however, for forecasting downsides in the global North. As we outline below, many people in the global North have experienced relative stagnation, whereas, albeit from a very low starting point and amidst considerable inequality, many people (but not all) have experienced improved development outcomes in the global South. We then explore what this apparent ‘big switch’ may tell us about contemporary economic globalisation.

The new geography of global uneven development

Significant portions of the population in the USA and other countries in the global North have experienced limited, if any, income gains in an era of globalisation. Milanovic’s (2016) ‘elephant graph’ (Figure 1) has quickly become a popular way to demonstrate the relative stagnation experienced in North America and Europe in recent decades. Exploring changes in real incomes between 1988 and 2008, he showed that those who particularly lost out on any relative gain in income were the global upper middle class (those between the 75th and 90th percentiles on the global income distribution) and the poorest 5% of the world population. Of these least successful percentiles, 86% of the population were from mature economies in the global North (Lakner and Milanovic, 2016, 23). Considering these contrasts more widely, a growing body of evidence shows that the global North’s dominance in the global economy is receding, with the share of high-income countries in global GDP having fallen from 76.8% in 2000 to 65.2% in 2015 (see Figure 1).

A different picture emerges in the global South. In Figure 1, it was Asians who comprised 90% of the population in the percentiles which did best in terms of relative income gains from 1988 to 2008 (Lakner and Milanovic, 2016, 223). The UNDP has remarked that

A striking feature of the world scene in recent years is the transformation of many ~~developing~~ countries into dynamic economies…doing well in economic growth and trade … they are collectively bolstering world economic growth, lifting other ~~developing~~ economies, reducing poverty and increasing wealth on a grand scale. (UNDP, 2013, 43)

The share of global GDP of low and middle income countries increased from 22.5% in 2000 to 34.1% in 2015 (Figure 2). Much of this increase is accounted for by China, as well as India and Brazil. Their share of global GDP, only 4.6% in 1960, 6.6% in 1990 and 9.3% in 2000, had almost doubled in the 21st century to 18% by 2015.

The development context of the global South has changed significantly since the turn of the Millennium, across a variety of important indicators. The total number of people in the world living on less than $1.90 per day (i.e. extreme poverty) has more than halved from 1.69 billion in 1999 to 766 million in 2013. At least by official estimates, the share of the population in the global South who are living in extreme poverty has fallen considerably this century. Whereas the percentage of the population in the global South with a daily consumption level of less than $1.90 was 33.4% in 1999, it was just 13.4% in 2013.2 The percentage of the world’s countries classified by the World Bank as low-income, albeit a very low threshold, more than halved within the first 15 years of the 21st century. Moreover, the total number of countries which are highly dependent on aid (having a net ODA > 9% of GNI) has fallen considerably, from 42 in 2000 to 29 in 2015, or from 34.1% to 23.2% of all low and middle-income countries with data available over that period.3

Considered overall, in comparison with the 1990s, the global South, in aggregate, now earns a much larger share of world GDP, has more middle-income countries, more middleclass people, less aid dependency, considerably greater life expectancy and lower child and maternal mortality. Table 1 provides some summary indicators for high-income countries (HICs) and low and middle-income countries (L&MICs), as somewhat imperfect approximations for global North and South.

After two hundred years of a ‘divergence, big time’ (Pritchett, 1997) between developed and ~~developing~~ countries following the Industrial Revolution, recent measurements suggest a change in the pattern of global inequality across a number of indicators (Horner and Hulme, 2017). The Global GINI of income distribution across all individuals in the world has fallen from 69.7 in 1988 to 66.8 in 2008 and 62.5 in 2013 (World Bank, 2016, 81). Analysis presented in the World Bank’s Taking on Inequality (2016) suggests that, in 1998, 26% of global income inequality was related to differences within countries, with the remaining 74% relating to differences among countries. By 2013, these shares were 35 and 65%. Two hundred years of a great divergence between global North and South now seems to have had some reversal, although more than half of an individual’s income can be accounted for by the country where he/she lives or was born (Milanovic, 2013). Inter-country inequality, rather than intra-country inequality, is still dominant, but it accounts for a diminished share of income-based and other inequalities (World Bank, 2016).

#### 2---War

Mousseau 19, Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida. (Michael, “The End of War,” International Security 44:1, 2019, https://sciences.ucf.edu/politics/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/2019/07/IS\_End-of-War.pdf)

Is war becoming obsolete? There is wide agreement among scholars that war has been in sharp decline since the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, even as there is little agreement as to its cause.1 Realists reject the idea that this trend will continue, citing states’ concerns with the “security dilemma”: that is, in anarchy states must assume that any state that can attack will; therefore, power equals threat, and changes in relative power result in conflict and war.2 Discussing the rise of China, Graham Allison calls this condition “Thucydides’s Trap,” a reference to the ancient Greek’s claim that Sparta’s fear of Athens’ growing power led to the Peloponnesian War.3 This article argues that there is no Thucydides Trap in international politics. Rather, the world is moving rapidly toward permanent peace, possibly in our lifetime. Drawing on economic norms theory,4 I show that what sometimes appears to be a Thucydides Trap may instead be a function of factors strictly internal to states and that these factors vary among them. In brief, leaders of states with advanced market-oriented economies have foremost interests in the principle of self-determination for all states, large and small, as the foundation for a robust global marketplace. War among these states, even making preparations for war, is not possible, because they are in a natural alliance to preserve and protect the global order. In contrast, leaders of states with weak internal markets have little interest in the global marketplace; they pursue wealth not through commerce, but through wars of expansion and demands for tribute. For these states, power equals threat, and therefore they tend to balance against the power of all states. Fearing stronger states, however, minor powers with weak internal markets tend to constrain their expansionist inclinations and, for security reasons, bandwagon with the relatively benign market-oriented powers. I argue that this liberal global hierarchy is unwittingly but systematically buttressing states’ embrace of market norms and values that, if left uninterrupted, is likely to culminate in permanent world peace, perhaps even something close to harmony. My argument challenges the realist assertion that great powers are engaged in a timeless competition over global leadership, because hegemony cannot exist among great powers with weak markets; these inherently expansionist states live in constant fear and therefore normally balance against the strongest state and its allies.5 Hegemony can exist only among market-oriented powers, because only they care about global order. Yet, there can be no competition for leadership among market powers, because they always agree with the goal of their strongest member (currently the United States) to preserve and protect the global order based on the principle of selfdetermination. If another commercial power, such as a rising China, were to overtake the United States, the world would take little notice, because the new leading power would largely agree with the global rules promoted and enforced by its predecessor. Vladimir Putin’s Russia, on the other hand, seeks to create chaos around the world. Most other powers, having market-oriented economies, continue to abide by the hegemony of the United States despite its relative economic decline since the end of World War II.6 To support my theory that domestic factors determine states’ alignment decisions, I analyze the voting preferences of members of the United Nations General Assembly from 1946 to 2010. I ªnd that states with weak internal markets tend to disagree with the foreign policy preferences of the largest market power (i.e., the United States), but more so if they are major powers or have stronger rather than weaker military and economic capabilities. The power of states with robust internal markets, in contrast, appears to have no effect on their foreign policy preferences, as market-oriented states align with the market leader regardless of their power status or capabilities. I corroborate that this pattern may be a consequence of states’ interest in the global market order by ªnding that states with higher levels of exports per capita are more likely than other states to have preferences aligned with those of the United States; those with lower levels of exports are more likely to have interests that do not align with the United States, but again more so if they are stronger rather than weaker. Liberal scholars of international politics have long offered explanations for why the incidence of war may decline, generally beginning with the assumption that although the security dilemma exists, it can be overcome with the help of factors external to states.7 Neoliberal institutionalists treat states as like units and international organization as an external condition.8 Trade interdependence is dyadic and thus an external condition.9 Democracy is an internal factor, but theories of democratic peace have an external dimension: peace is the result of the expectations of states’ behavior informed by the images that leaders create of each other’s regime types.10 In contrast, I show that the security dilemma may not exist at all and how peace can emerge in anarchy with states pursuing their interests determined entirely by internal factors.11

#### 3---Climate change

Smith 19 – (Noah Smith, assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook University; “Dumping Capitalism Won’t Save the Planet”; Bloomberg; D.A. August 25th 2020, [Published April 5th 2019]; <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-04-05/capitalism-is-more-likely-to-limit-climate-change-than-socialism>) //LFS—JCM

The climate threat is certainly dire, and carbon taxes [are unlikely](http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/10/a-carbon-tax-cant-solve-climate-change-but-we-should-do-it.html) to be enough to solve the problem. But eco-socialism is probably not going to be an effective method of addressing that threat. Dismantling an entire economic system is never easy, and probably would touch off armed conflict and major political upheaval. In the scramble to win those battles, even the socialists would almost certainly abandon their limitation on fossil-fuel use — either to support military efforts, or to keep the population from turning against them. The precedent here is the Soviet Union, whose multidecade effort to reshape its economy by force amid confrontation with the West led to profound environmental degradation. The world's climate does not have several decades to spare. Even without international conflict, there’s little guarantee that moving away from capitalism would mitigate our impact on the environment. Since socialist leader Evo Morales took power in Bolivia, living standards [have improved](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-02-22/bolivia-s-problem-is-macroeconomics-not-socialism) substantially for the average Bolivian, which is great. But this has come at the cost of higher emissions. Meanwhile, the capitalist U.S managed to decrease its per capita emissions a bit during this same period (though since the U.S. is a rich country, its absolute level of emissions is much higher). In other words, in terms of economic growth and carbon emissions, Bolivia looks similar to more capitalist developing countries. That suggests that faced with a choice of enriching their people or helping to save the climate, even socialist leaders will often choose the former. And that same political calculus will probably hold in China and the U.S., the world’s top carbon emitters — leaders who demand draconian cuts in living standards in pursuit of environmental goals will have trouble staying in power. The best hope for the climate therefore lies in reducing the tradeoff between material prosperity and carbon emissions. That requires technology — solar, wind and nuclear power, energy storage, electric cars and other vehicles, carbon-free [cement](https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/worlds-first-zero-emission-cement-plant-takes-shape-in-norway/) production and so on. The best [climate](https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/15/how-to-decarbonize-america-and-the-world/) policy [plans](https://www.dataforprogress.org/green-new-deal) all involve technological improvement as a key feature. Recent developments show that the technology-centered approach can work. A [recent report](https://about.bnef.com/blog/battery-powers-latest-plunge-costs-threatens-coal-gas/) by Bloomberg New Energy Finance analyzed about 7000 projects in 46 countries, and found that large drops in the cost of solar power from photovoltaic systems, wind power and lithium-ion batteries have made utility-scale renewable electricity competitive with fossil fuels. A 76 percent decline in the cost of energy for short-term battery storage since 2012 is especially important. In a blog post, futurist and energy writer Ramez Naam [underscores](http://rameznaam.com/2019/04/02/the-third-phase-of-clean-energy-will-be-the-most-disruptive-yet/) the significance of these developments. Naam notes the important difference between renewables being cheap enough to outprice new fossil-fuel plants, and being inexpensive enough to undercut existing plants. The former is already the case across much of the world, which is among the reasons for an 84 percent [decrease](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/mar/28/global-collapse-in-number-of-new-coal-fired-power-plants) in the number of new coal-fired plants worldwide since 2015. But when it becomes cheaper to scrap existing fossil-fuel plants and build renewables in their place, it will allow renewables to start replacing coal and gas much more quickly. Naam cites examples from Florida and [Indiana](https://www.utilitydive.com/news/even-in-indiana-new-renewables-are-cheaper-than-existing-coal-plants/540242/) where this is already being done. He cites industry predictions that replacing existing fossil-fuel plants with renewables will be economically efficient almost everywhere at some point in the next decade. Electricity is far from the only source of carbon emissions — there’s also transportation, manufacturing (especially of steel and cement), home and office heating, and agriculture to worry about. But the rapid advance of solar technology is a huge victory in the struggle against climate change, because it will allow people all over the world to have electricity without cooking the planet. And how was this victory achieved? A combination of smart government policy and private industry. Massachusetts Institute of Technology researchers Goksin Kavlak, James McNerney and Jessika Trancik in a [recent paper](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421518305196?via%253Dihub) evaluated the factors behind the solar-price decline from 1980 to 2012. They concluded that from 1980 to 2001, government-funded research and development was the main factor in bringing down costs, but from 2001 to 2012, the biggest factor was economies of scale. These economies of scale were driven by private industry increasing output, but with government subsidies helping to increase the incentive to ramp up production. It’s apparent, therefore, that both government and profit-seeking enterprises have their roles to play. Government funds the development of early-stage technology and then helps push the private sector toward adopting those technologies, while private companies compete to find ever-cheaper methods of implementation. Instead of eco-socialism, it’s eco-industrialism. If there’s any system that can beat climate change, this looks like it.

#### Prefer our evidence over narrative pessimism---their ev succumbs to negativity biases that downplay the world’s improvements.

McAfee 19, \*Andrew Paul McAfee, a principal research scientist at MIT, is cofounder and codirector of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy at the MIT Sloan School of Management; (2019, “More from Less: The Surprising Story of How We Learned to Prosper Using Fewer Resources and What Happens Next”, https://b-ok.cc/book/5327561/8acdbe)

Max Roser’s Our World in Data is one of my favorite websites, for two reasons. The first is that it contains a lot of valuable information. The second is that it tells an invaluable story—an optimistic and hopeful one. The evidence presented in Our World in Data and in books like Julian Simon’s The Ultimate Resource, Bjørn Lomborg’s Skeptical Environmentalist , Steven Pinker’s Enlightenment Now , and Hans Rosling’s Factfulness shows clearly that most of the things we should care about are getting better. Not all, but most. This happy fact applies both to the state of nature and the human condition.

The Power of Negative Thinking

But do your friends and family believe that a lot of important things are getting better? Do you? If not, they and you are far from alone. Most people don’t appreciate that things are improving as the four horsemen advance. For example, Rosling writes, “Over the past 20 years, the proportion of people living in extreme poverty has almost halved. But in online polls, in most countries, fewer than 10 percent of people knew this.” Most people believe things are get ting worse. Across all countries surveyed in 2017, only 20 percent of people correctly answered that poverty rates have declined over the previous twenty years.

Why isn’t the good news sinking in? A few factors are at work. One is our basic human “negativity bias”: bad news makes a bigger impression on us and stays with us longer than does neutral or good news. Another factor is that the press tends to emphasize sensationalistic news, which is often negative. Journalism’s jaded motto is “If it bleeds, it leads.”

One other important factor, I think, was identified by the British philosopher John Stuart Mill in an 1828 speech: “I have observed that not the man who hopes when others despair, but the man who despairs when others hope, is admired by a large class of persons as a sage.” In many elite circles and publications negativity seems to be a sign of seriousness and rigor, while optimism and positivity seem naive and under-informed.

Simon, Rosling, Pinker, Roser, and others have pushed back against this institutional negativity bias. They’ve done work that is both rigorous and positive. In fact, they’ve shown that doing rigorous work—looking systematically at the best available evidence—often compels you to be positive about many things because the evidence is so encouraging.

### 1NC---AT: Method

#### Deleuzian focus on flight and resiliency rein-scribes defeatism and posits individuals as incapable of actualizing change — only striving for material, political change solves

Bryant 6 — Levi Bryant (Discipline Lead for the Department of Philosophy at Collin College, a Lacanian psychoanalyst, and Chair of the Critical Philosophy program at the New Centre for Research and Practice), 7-24-2006, “Hallward’s Critique of Deleuze: UPDATED”, Larval Subjects, https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2006/07/24/hallwards-critique-of-deleuze-updated/

UPDATE: Since being written, this post has gotten a lot of attention and traffic. After subsequent reflection, I have concluded that while Hallward’s book is well worth reading and is a carefully researched and well written study of Deleuze’s thought, the conclusions that he reaches are arrived at as a result of ignoring Deleuze’s account of individuation as developed in texts such as chapter 4 and 5 of Difference and Repetition, and as late as The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque. The virtual cannot be detached from the actual in the manner suggested by Hallward. If Deleuze often emphasizes the dimension of the virtual over the actual, then this is because the process of actualization– as developed in chapters 4 and 5 of Difference and Repetition –tends to cancel difference in extensity. A focus on the virtual is thus designed to return to these missed potentialities and reactivate them so that new individuations might become possible. I develop these claims more thoroughly in subsequent posts on Deleuze. \*\*\* As I mentioned in a previous post, I’ve been deeply impressed, if not envious, of Hallward’s study of Deleuze. This has to be the most careful and comprehensive discussion of Deleuze I’ve yet encountered anywhere. However, Hallward does present a substantial critique of Deleuze. In light of my previous post about repeating the Enlightenment, it might be worthwhile to explore this critique as to indicate why I am inclined to believe that Deleuze and Guattari are a dead end. Succinctly summing up his account of Deleuze’s ontology, Hallward writes, As we have repeatedly seen, the second corollary of Deleuze’s disqualification of actuality concerns the paralysis of the subject or actor. Since what powers Deleuze’s cosmology is the immediate differentiation of creation through the infinite proliferation of virtual creatings, the creatures that actualise these creatings are confined to a derivative if not limiting role. A creature’s own interests, actions or decisions are of minimal or preliminary significance at best: the renewal of creation always requires the paralysis and dissolution of the creature per se. The notion of a constrained or situated freedom, the notion that a subject’s own decisions might have genuine consequences– the whole notion, in short of strategy— is thoroughly foreign to Deleuze’s conception of thought. Deleuze obliges us, in other words, to make an absolute distinction between what a subject does or decides and what is done or decided through the subject. By rendering this distinction absolute he abandons the category of the subject altogether. (OTW, 162) The fundamental distinction that governs Deleuze’s thought, argues Hallward, is the distinction between the creature (the organism, the actualized being) and the vital creating. The creature always marks a reactive limit to the creating, so the aim is to “counter-actualize” our being, so as to return to the eternal and unlimited virtual creatings that belong to the One-All or Whole, that are always non-relational, and that are unlimited in their differential being. For instance, following The Logic of Sense, we are not to think the wound in terms of the set of causes and circumstances that brought it about, but rather as radically subtracted from this dimension of actualization and as something that preceded us such that we only came to actualize it. The virtual creating of the wound as event is to be subtracted from the psychological, physical, and social context around which the wound comes-to-be. Hallward gives an excellent example of what Deleuze has in mind, drawing on Deleuze’s reading of Dicken’s late novel Our Mutual Friend. The unloved character Riderhood, who makes his living fishing corpses out of the Thames, himself almost drowns in that same river when his boat is run down by a steamer. Some onlookers then carry him, half-dead, up to Miss Abbey’s pub, and a doctor is called on to revive him. ‘No one’, Dickens writes, ‘has the least regard for the man; with them all, he has been an object of avoidance, suspicion, and aversion.’ Nevertheless, the spectacle of this struggle between life and death solicits a response deeper than empathy: The spark of life within him is curiously separable from himself now, and they have a deep interest in it, probably because it IS life, and they are living and must die […]. Neither Riderhood in this world, nor Riderhood in the other, could draw tears from them; but a striving human soul between the two can do it easily. He is struggling to come back. Now, he is almost here, now he is far away again. And yet– like us all, when we swoon –like us all, every day of our lives when we wake– he is instinctively unwilling to be restored to the consciousness of this existence, and would be left dormant, if he could. Life and medicine soon win the day, and the patient recovers. But ‘as he grows warm, the doctor and the four men cool. The spark of life was deeply interesting while it was in abeyance, but now that it has got established in Mr. Riderhood, there appears to be a general desire that circumstances had admitted of its being developed in anybody else, rather than that gentleman.’ The most important thing to retain from this exemplary episode, I think, is the crucial difference between the spark (virtual ‘creating’) and the person (actual ‘creature’) it animates… He is individuated by what he does and has done, by his origins and background, by the personality he has come to acquire, by the relations he sustains with other people, and so on. Such is the creature dimension. The spark of life, however, substists on a quite different plane. The spark is perfectly unique, perfectly singular –it is this spark, and no other –yet fully ‘separable’ from the object it sustains. This is the point that interests Deleuze: No one has desscribed what a life is better than Charles Dickens […]. Between [Riderhood’s] life and his death, there is a moment that is only that of a life playing with death. The life of the individual gives way to an impersonal and yet singular life that releases a pure event freed from the accidents of internal and external life, that is, from the subjectivity and objectivity of what happens: a ‘Homo tantum’ with whom everyone emphathises and who attains a sort of beatitude. It is […] a life of pure immanence, neutral, beyond good and evil, for it was only the subject that incarnated it in the midsts of things that made it good or bad. The life of such individuality fades away in favour of the singular life immanent to a man who no longer has a name, though he can be mistaken for no other. (OTW, 24-5) I quote this passage at length because it illustrates, so well, Deleuze’s logic of the distinction between the creating and the creature, and what Deleuze is aiming at with counter-actualization. Hallward is able to trace this logic, with considerable detail and sophistication, from Deleuze’s earliest work all the way through his collaborative work with Guattari (“Immanence: A Life…” is Deleuze’s final published essay). What Deleuze ultimately aims at is this virtual dimension of a life that so captures the attention of the onlookers. This life is not the life of the organism, of a structure or system with a history, and which interacts with the world, but of the body-without-organs, that is free of all organistic constraints characterizing actuality, and which is essentially impersonal and anonymous, while remaining a singular expression of the One-All. For Deleuze, this is the dimension of true difference, authentic creativity, and genuine vital becoming. The actual is but a surface-effect, as Deleuze argues in detail in The Logic of Sense. Now, what’s worth noticing in this incident depicted in Dicken’s novel, is that nothing changes with regard to Riderhood’s situation. The level of actuality characterizing the world or situation in which Riderhood appears (in Badiou’s sense) remains essentially the same. We are told that Riderhood occupies a certain position with regard to the other citizens. He is distrusted and disliked. For a brief moment, when approaching death, Riderhood becomes anonymous and impersonal life and this position disappears. But what the other characters identify with is not Riderhood, but the impersonal life that his actualized organism embodies. When Riderhood escapes death, the representational social structure returns in exactly the same form that it had before. The point, then, is that impersonal singularities of the sort described by Deleuze do not transform the structure of a situation. Indeed, the situation continues exactly as it did before. In my responses to Yusef from the Enlightenment Underground, I argued that the thought of Deleuze and Guattari is essentially that of the slave. No doubt such a claim must sound strange from the standpoint of standard receptions of Deleuze and Guattari’s thought. However, these passages make clear just why this is the case. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel argues that the freedom of the Stoic is essentially a negative or vain freedom, in that it is freedom in thought alone, not in action (cf. “Freedom of self-consciousness: Stoicism, Scepticism, and Unhappy Consciousness”). As Epictetus argues, we are free to determine what we think, desire, and feel so long as we recognize that which is within our control and that which is not within our control. For Epictetus, of course, very little is in our control so the aim is to transform consciousness rather than the world. We must accept the world the way it is and go about changing how we experience this world by transforming the nature of our judgments, rather than transforming the world itself. Deleuze’s ontology and ethics is thus, essentially, the spiritual vision of the mystical wise-man calling for withdrawal from the world of fractured appearances, much like Plotinus calls us to escape from the multiplicity of appearances so as to discern the One. If Hallward’s reading of Deleuze’s ontology is accurate, then this is essentially what Deleuze and Guattari are offering us with their account of counter-actualization and lines of flight. Turn away, they say, from the predicates characterizing a situation and instead pursue vital life. This is something that can be practiced by slave, freeman, woman, minority, worker, denizen of Guantanimo Bay being tortured, etc. And significantly, it is something that does not transform the structure of the actualized situation**,** though it certainly might allow us to stoically endure the situations in which we find ourselves actualized. It is not surprising that Deleuze would be led to this position, influenced as he is by Spinoza. However, if the point of philosophy, as Marx said, is to change the world**,** then it is clear that we cannot ignore actuality in this way. As Hallward puts it, Deleuze writes a philosophy of (virtual) difference without (actual) others. He intuits a purely internal or self-differing difference, a difference that excludes any constitutive mediation between the differed. Such a philosophy precludes a distinctively relational conception of politics as a matter of course. The politics of the future are likely to depend less on virtual mobility than on more resilant forms of cohesion, on more principled forms of commitment, on more integrated forms of coordination, on more resistant forms of defense. Rather than align ourselves with the nomadic war machine, our first task should be to develop appropriate ways of responding

to the newly aggressive techniques of invasion, penetration and occupation which serve to police the embattled margins of empire. (OTW, 162-3) Deleuze and Guattari go a long way towards redeeming philosophy and rescuing it from postmodern skepticism and the claim that all is discursive constructions, yet, at the present moment in my thinking and understanding of their work, I do not think they go far enough. If we genuinely seek change, then actuality cannot be ignored **in this way**. My tendency has been to think Deleuze as a thinker of complex, emergent systems. Such systems, of course, pertain to the actual, not the virtual as understood by Deleuze. They are bodies with organs and in environment from which they differentiate themselves. They are emergent, but not from virtual singularities, but complex causal relationships. Hallward’s reading makes clear just why this is a significant misreading (something that could already be symptomatically sensed in DeLanda’s Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, as it’s never clear there what the virtual contributes or adds to the already fine accounts of phenomena he gives in terms of systems). As Hallward remarks, There is no more an interactive relation between this virtual or composing power and its actual or composed result than there is between a given set of genes and the organism that incarnates them. Along the lines of this last analogy, it might be worth briefly cementing this point with one final illustration, the case of biological evolution. As Deleuze and Guattari understand it, biological evolution proceeds neither through the relations of struggle, competition or support that may exist between actual organisms, nor through the dialectical interaction between actual organisms and their actual environment. As opposed to an ‘orthodox Darwinism with its focus on discrete units of selection’, they maintain that ‘evolution takes place from the virtual to actuals. Evolution is actualisation, actualisation is creation’. As Mark Hansen has recently demonstrated in convincing detail [Hansen, ‘Becoming as Creative Involution? Contextualizing Deleuze and Guattari’s Biophilosophy’, Postmodern Culture 11:1 (September 2000)], because they dismiss the actual ‘organism as a molar form that negatively limits life’, Deleuze and Guattari’s approach to biological individuation remains profoundly ‘alien to the conceptual terrain of current biology and complexity theory’. Rather than recent versions of complexity theory of post-Darwinian biology, the real models for Deleuzian individuation are again the theophanic philosophies of Spinoza and Leibniz. Spinoza’s account couldn’t be simpler. A human being, like any finite being, ‘has no power of its own except insofar as it is part of a whole […]. We are a part of the power of God’ (Expressionism and Philosophy, 91-2). (OTW, 52-3) For me this is the most damning aspect of Hallward’s critique. Here it becomes clear just why it is so fundamentally necessary to banish the imaginary (in the Lacanian sense) fantasy of the Whole or Totality from philosophy altogether, for wherever there is a whole the individual becomes powerless and a mere fractal iteration of the All. The question, for me, thus becomes that of what’s worth preserving in Deleuze? What was it that so captivated me about Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense when I first began studying them so many years ago? And what was I reading into these masterpieces of ontology that was already my own?

#### Lines of flight culminate in worse violence — people will inevitably use them to violently re-exert power with no societal inhibitors

Diken and Laustsen 1 — Bülent Dkien (lecturer in Sociology at Lancaster University); Carsten Laustsen (Ph.D. student at the University of Copenhagen, Department of Political Sciences), 2001, “’Enjoy your fight!’ – ‘Fight Club’ as a symptom of the Network Society”, September 2001, Department of Sociology, http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/fass/resources/sociology-online-papers/papers/diken-laustsen-enjoy-your-fight.pdf)KJR

The first danger is that a line of flight can become re-stratified: in the fear of complete destratification, rigid segmentation and segregation may seem attractive. Whenever a line of flight is stopped by an organization, institution, interpretation, a black hole, etc., a “reterritorialization” takes place. In spite of the fact that Fight Club makes a mockery of an “illusion of safety” in the beginning, its line of flight is followed by reterritorialization. It evolves into a project, Project Mayhem. Becoming a “bureaucracy of anarchy” (Palahniuk 1997: 119), Project Mayhem is the point at which Fight Club reterritorializes as “the paranoid position of the mass subject, with all the identifications of the individual with the group, the group with the leader, and the leader with the group” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 34). In comparison with Fight Club, Project Mayhem is centralised around Jack/Tyler who gives the multiplicity of lines of escape a resonance. Methods change too: “We have to show these men and women freedom by enslaving them, and show them courage by frightening them” (Ibid. 149). The new rules are: “you don’t ask questions”; “you have to trust Tyler”, and so on (Ibid. 125). Fight Club was a gang, Project Mayhem is more like an army. Fight Club produces a microcosm of the affections of the rigid: it deterritorializes, massifies, but only in order to stop deterritorialization, to invent new territorializations. The second danger of the line of flight, which is less obvious but more interesting is “clarity”. Clarity arises when one attains a perception of the molecular texture of the “social”, when the holes in it are revealed. What used to be compact and whole seems now to be leaking, a texture that enables de-differentiations, overlappings, migrations, hybridizations. Clarity emerges with the transformation of Fight Club into Project Mayhem. “Everything is nothing, and it’s cool to be enlightened” (Palahniuk 1997: 64). Clarity is also the reason why Fight Club fascinates its members. In this sense, Fight Club does not only reproduce the dangers of the rigid in a miniature scale; it is microfascism. “Instead of the great paranoid fear, we are trapped in a thousand little monomanias, self-evident truths, and clarities that gush from every black hole and no longer form a system, but are only rumble and buzz, blinding lights giving any and everybody the mission of self-appointed judge, dispenser of the justice, policeman, neighbourhood SS man” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 228). Interestingly, whereas the movie clearly makes a self-reflexive mockery of Project Mayhem in the context of the first danger (macrofascism), the aspects of Fight Club that do not resonate in Project Mayhem (that is, its microfascist aspects) escape its ironic perspective. It seems as if the movie assumes that power predominantly pertains to molar lines. But lines of flight are not exempted from power relations, and there is a microfascism in Fight Club that cannot be confined to Project Mayhem. It is in this context remarkable that Fight Club operates as a deterritorialized line of flight, as a war machine that is violently opposed to the state; its members are not merely the Oedipalized paranoiacs of the capitalist state order. Its microfascism can be understood best as a transgressive delirium. “What makes fascism dangerous is its molecular or micropolitical power, for it is a mass movement”, a proliferation of molecular interactions, “skipping from point to point, before beginning to resonate together in the National Socialist State” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 214-5). If Project Mayhem is the ridiculous Department of Sociology at Lancaster University 7 Nazi-type organization with unreflexive skinheads who just repeat Tyler’s orders, Fight Club is the molecular face of fascism. The third danger: a line of flight can lose its creative potentials and become a line of death. This is precisely what happens in Fight Club: “the line of flight crossing the wall, getting out of the black holes, but instead of connecting with other lines and each time augmenting its valence, turning to destruction, abolition pure and simple, the passion for abolition” (1987: 229). In fact, fascism is the result of an intense line of flight that becomes a line of death, wanting self-destruction and “death through the death of others” (Ibid. 230). A line of flight that desires its own repression. The point at which escape becomes a line of death is the point at which war (destruction) becomes the main object of the war machine rather than its supplement. Fight Club, transforming into Project Mayhem, becomes an instrument of pure destruction and violence, of complete destratification, a war machine that has war as its object. In other words, the regression to the undifferentiated or complete disorganization is as dangereous as transcendence and organization. Tyler, the alluring and charismatic, the freewheeling pervert of Fight Club, is as dangerous as society. If there are two dangers, the strata and complete destratification, suicide, Fight Club fights only the first. Therefore a relevant question, never asked by microfascists, is whether it is not “necessary to retain a minimum of strata, a minimum of forms and functions, a minimal subject from which to extract materials, affects, and assemblages” (Deleuze & Guattari 1987: 270). The test of desire is not denouncing false desires but distinguishing between that which pertains to the strata, complete destratification, and that which pertains to line of flight, a test, which Fight Club does not pass (Ibid. 165). Let’s qualify this point by investigating the way the logic of the cut works in the film.

#### Their disavowal of the future results in lifeboat communism, where the privileged retreat into theoretical enclaves insulated from the predatory violence of capitalism and political engagement becomes stifled

Lear 12 — Ben Lear, Viewpoitn Magazine Editor, “Lifeboat Communism – A Review of Franco “Bifo” Berardi’s After the Future,” May 18 2012, <http://viewpointmag.com/2012/05/18/lifeboat-communism-a-review-of-franco-bifo-berardis-after-the-future/>, wcp)

What does the end of the future mean for rad­i­cal pol­i­tics? It is at this point that Bifo’s argu­ment becomes prob­lem­atic. In an argu­ment that inter­sects with groups such as Tiqqun, Bifo argues that we must see “Com­mu­nism as a neces­sity in the col­lapse of cap­i­tal.” Dis­tant from the vol­un­tarism of pre­vi­ous forms of Com­mu­nist pol­i­tics, this “post-growth Com­mu­nism” will be best under­stood as a nec­es­sary response to capital’s refusal of labour. Cut adrift from the “oppor­tu­nity” to work, with wel­fare sys­tems dis­man­tled, Bifo argues that we will wit­ness the pro­lif­er­a­tion of zones of auton­omy respond­ing to the needs of an increas­ingly pre­car­i­ous and super­flu­ous social body. Com­mu­nist pol­i­tics will emerge from an exo­dus, both vol­un­tary and com­pul­sory, from a stag­nat­ing and increas­ingly preda­tory state-capital nexus. This exo­dus is both social, in the devel­op­ment of an alter­na­tive infra­struc­ture, and per­sonal, in the with­drawal from the hyper-stimulation of the semi­otic econ­omy. Bifo aban­dons hope in col­lec­tive con­tes­ta­tion at the level of the political. Bifo’s pol­i­tics could be described as a kind of “lifeboat com­mu­nism.” As the cri­sis rip­ples, mutates, and deep­ens, Bifo sees the role of com­mu­nism as the cre­ation of spaces of sol­i­dar­ity to blunt the worst effects of the cri­sis of social repro­duc­tion. Gone is the demand for a bet­ter world for all, the lib­er­a­tion of our col­lec­tive social wealth, or the unlock­ing of the social poten­tials of tech­nol­ogy. Rather, Bifo’s pol­i­tics are based around insu­lat­ing a nec­es­sar­ily small por­tion of soci­ety from the dic­tates of cap­i­tal. By with­draw­ing from the polit­i­cal sphere, we accept the like­li­hood of los­ing the final scraps of the wel­fare state and con­cede the ter­rain of the polit­i­cal to zom­bie pol­i­tics and preda­tory cap­i­tal. Rather than seek­ing new forms of orga­ni­za­tion to re-enter the polit­i­cal stage, Bifo seems to sug­gest that we seek shel­ter beneath it as best we can. This shy­ing away from the polit­i­cal stage is the weak­ness at the heart of the book. Recent erup­tions of polit­i­cal strug­gle have cap­tured the col­lec­tive imag­i­na­tion because they demon­strate that polit­i­cal con­tes­ta­tion is still pos­si­ble today, in spite of the obsta­cles Bifo has described. The Occupy move­ment and the upris­ings in the Mid­dle East and North Africa have res­onated with all those who still have hope in col­lec­tive strug­gle. Although these move­ments have encoun­tered vary­ing prob­lems, to which we must develop solu­tions, they dis­pel the idea of an unchange­able present. The cur­rent block­ages to suc­cess­ful organ­is­ing have been shown to be *strate­gic and tac­ti­cal*, not ter­mi­nal. Mis­di­ag­nos­ing the cur­rent iner­tia of post-political pub­lic life as a ter­mi­nal con­di­tion leads the left towards an evac­u­a­tion of the polit­i­cal, while we should instead reassert its pri­macy.  If we aban­don any hope of fight­ing in, against, and beyond the exist­ing archi­tec­ture of the state and cap­i­tal, and instead seek refuge in small com­munes, and go-slow prac­tices, we aban­don all real hope of a gen­er­al­ized, or gen­er­al­iz­able, eman­ci­pa­tory pol­i­tics. Although Bifo’s analy­sis of the dif­fi­cul­ties of col­lec­tive action res­onates with all of us who have attempted to orga­nize strug­gles in the past few decades, the pro­posal for a sim­ple with­drawal from cap­i­tal­ism is a bleak pol­i­tics indeed – which, at its most opti­mistic, calls for an orderly default by por­tions of the pro­le­tariat. The hori­zons of com­mu­nist pol­i­tics appear much nar­rower when cap­i­tal­ism is no longer seen as the repos­i­tory of a vast store of social wealth await­ing col­lec­tive redis­tri­b­u­tion, but rather rede­fined as an unas­sail­able site of uni­ver­sal and per­ma­nent aus­ter­ity com­bined with widen­ing social redundancy. It is hard to imag­ine a net­work of self-organized projects and sys­tems sup­port­ing the major­ity of the pop­u­la­tion in the con­text of an increas­ingly preda­tory cap­i­tal­ism. Emerg­ing from the and iso­lated left­ist scenes, this lifeboat com­mu­nism will by its very nature have a lim­ited car­ry­ing capac­ity, as the anar­chist expe­ri­ence in post-Katrina New Orleans attests. The lifeboats that Bifo calls for will undoubt­edly be too small and makeshift to har­bor us all. The cri­sis is twofold. It is a cri­sis of cap­i­tal­ist prof­itabil­ity, and of an increas­ingly pre­car­i­ous and sur­plus global pro­le­tariat whose repro­duc­tion (as both labour and body) is under threat. It is unlikely that the pro­lif­er­a­tion of com­munes, squats, food co-ops, file shar­ers, urban gar­den­ers, and vol­un­tary health ser­vices will bring forth a new, bet­ter world. But while the cur­rent seem­ingly post-political sit­u­a­tion throws up mas­sive obsta­cles to orga­niz­ing, there is still a poten­tial for col­lec­tive con­tes­ta­tion. The cap­i­tal­ist state, racked by its own legit­i­macy cri­sis and weekly polit­i­cal scan­dals, is more vul­ner­a­ble than it appears. We need only recall the period of unex­pected hope built by stu­dents in Britain, occu­piers in Oak­land, and vast swathes of North Africa and the Mid­dle East dur­ing the past two years. These move­ments were mobilised through the betrayal of a vision of the future – but along­side their rage, they put forth a hope which can guide our politics. The task at hand is to unlearn old behav­iour and to forge new tac­ti­cal and organ­i­sa­tional weapons for strug­gle. Bifo’s con­tri­bu­tion is a timely and chal­leng­ing one, but it ulti­mately leads us back towards a DIY cul­ture and “out­reach” pol­i­tics. As our move­ments come to terms with these lim­its, we must also hold onto the belief that lux­ury for all is pos­si­ble. The social poten­tial of unfilled blocks of flats, emerg­ing tech­nolo­gies like 3D-printing, and the desires of the mil­lions of under­em­ployed, should remind us of this. This will not be pos­si­ble with­out a col­lec­tive strug­gle against the state and the demands of cap­i­tal, one which simul­ta­ne­ously defends what we have and attempts to move beyond it. A retreat to lifeboat pol­i­tics is both pre­ma­ture and a self-fulfilling prophecy. While Bifo cor­rectly analy­ses the cur­rent con­junc­ture – clearly iden­ti­fy­ing the post-political state, the weak­ness of the Left, the cri­sis of prof­itabil­ity and new forms of labour, and their impact on the sub­ject – his polit­i­cal pre­scrip­tions lead us in the wrong direc­tion. Just as Bifo does, we place the strug­gle against work at the cen­ter; but we can also seek to lib­er­ate social wealth, rather than insu­late a lucky few from the rav­ages of cap­i­tal. Rather than “No Future,” we must raise a dif­fer­ent ban­ner: “The future’s here, it just needs reorganizing.”

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#### This affirmative would anti-trust social media to prevent negative effects of the internet on mental health. Solves “doom-scrolling.”

Morton 21, Theodore Nierenberg Professor of Economics (Fiona, June 8th, “Social Media Is Addictive. Do Regulators Need to Step In?” *Yale Insights*, <https://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/social-media-is-addictive-do-regulators-need-to-step-in>, Accessed 1-30-2022)

If you’ve ever delayed sleep to doomscroll on Twitter or checked Instagram just one more time to see if someone else liked that selfie, you know that social media can be a time suck. But is it addictive? A growing body of medical evidence suggests it is, economist Fiona Scott Morton of Yale SOM writes in a new paper, co-authored with James Niel Rosenquist of Harvard Medical School and Samuel N. Weinstein of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. That has important implications for how regulators should oversee social media platforms. And it also has surprising implications for antitrust enforcement. Scott Morton, Rosenquist, and Weinstein argue that antitrust enforcement has long relied on assumptions about how to measure consumer welfare that simply don’t work when a company is making a habit-forming product. Indeed, Scott Morton points out, the entire field of behavioral economics has arisen to give us more sophisticated ways to understand “irrational” decision making, including evaluating the impact on our welfare of goods and services that come with self-control issues, from gym memberships and energy-inefficient air conditioners to opioids. The addictive qualities of social media are compounded by a lack of competition in the industry. When air conditioners compete, the more efficient ones can gain an advantage by advertising their low running costs. But without meaningful social media competition or regulation, companies have little incentive to change the addictive quality of their content. “We don’t want to ban cars because they are dangerous, nor would that be a good solution for social media,” Scott Morton emphasizes. “Instead we limit the danger of cars with tools like speed limits, traffic lights, drivers’ licenses, and seatbelts—and we have lots of competition and choice. In digital media we need to find a way to control the stuff that’s harming us, and our children in particular, while keeping the healthy part.” She believes smarter antitrust enforcement could help, making room for newer and safer social media platforms in the market as well as more competition. For decades, the medical community was hesitant to accept that addiction was possible without the ingestion of a physical substance. But, as Scott Morton and her co-authors write, growing understanding of so-called behavioral addiction has chipped away at that resistance. In fact, gambling addiction is now recognized in the latest edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Social media and gambling can hijack the brain’s reward system in similar ways, the researchers argue. In the case of gambling, you’ll keep pulling the slot-machine lever even after you’ve lost hundreds of dollars, just in case the next one is a winner; in the case of social media, you’ll get lost in the infinite scroll, no matter what else you should be doing. It’s no coincidence that many of us find social media so hard to resist. The business model platforms have adopted depends on people giving up their time: the longer a user is swiping away, the more revenue-generating ads they’ll see. Features such as likes, comments, autoplay, and algorithmic promotion of emotionally arousing content are designed to keep users coming back again and again. Scott Morton has seen it all firsthand. “Twitter will show me some posts, I’ll look at them, and then two minutes later, they’ll meter out some more…You can watch them try to drip it out so that I stay on the platform longer,” she says. In theory, of course, there’s nothing wrong with spending a lot of time on social media. Companies have argued that the hours we log represent positive engagement with the platform: we like what we’re seeing, and so we stay. But in practice, Scott Morton and her co-authors note, survey data finds that a large number of heavy social media users wish they used social media less because of its negative effects on their lives—a classic tug-of-war between short-term impulses and long-term goals that is a hallmark of compulsive behavior. Early data also links social media use among adolescents to mood disorders and ADHD. The dangers seem particularly acute for girls. So, what does this all mean for regulators trying to decide whether social media platforms are engaging in anti-competitive conduct? Baked into antitrust enforcement is the idea of increasing consumer welfare: enforcement ought to make life better for consumers by promoting competition so that goods become cheaper, better, or both. And economists have long argued that one especially useful way to look at consumer welfare is through what’s called output—the quantity of goods or services produced in a given market. “Historically, we have thought of pro-competitive things as being those that increase output and non-competitive things as those that decrease output,” Scott Morton explains. If the merger of two ice cream companies results in an overall larger ice cream market, then (the basic argument goes) consumers must have benefited, either because ice cream was cheaper and they bought more, or because it was better and they bought more. If the merger reduces the size of the ice cream market, it must have been anticompetitive. But the logic of output maximization falls apart when it comes to any addictive product. For someone addicted to, say, OxyContin, giving them more OxyContin represents an increase in output—but it surely doesn’t represent a simple increase in consumer welfare. “This shortcut, which is, ‘Let’s use an output measure like number of pills to proxy for consumer surplus,’—it isn’t a valid shortcut anymore, not when you’ve got an addictive product,” Scott Morton says. “Giving people a larger quantity of something they’re addicted to is likely not increasing social welfare.” So, rather than looking at output, regulators need to take a more expansive view of consumer welfare, Scott Morton and her co-authors argue—a view that incorporates the specific nature of the product in question. In the case of social media, an antitrust case might rely on whether a company’s business model offers incentives for addiction or has other negative effects on users’ behavior. By looking at social media companies from this perspective, regulators can promote competition and innovation. It may seem paradoxical to argue that the answer to the problem of social media is more social media, but there’s good reason to believe it. Basic consumer protection regulations would also help by creating a level playing field. With more companies vying for users, Scott Morton explains, they’ll have a greater incentive to differentiate in ways users value. In all kinds of markets—cars, movies, food—companies have thrived by promoting themselves as the safe option. A non-addictive social media platform could have similar consumer appeal. “More social media sites means I can choose the site that offers me fewer ads, less addiction, more of the content that interests me,” Scott Morton says. How far are we from a world of safer social media? Scott Morton thinks there’s reason to be optimistic. Indeed, considering how long it took to rein in exploitative practices in products such as cigarettes and credit cards, there’s an argument that social media regulation is on a fast track. Lawmakers and regulators are paying more attention because “today, the harms are really much more visible to everybody,” Scott Morton says. “I think the younger generation is speaking up more and they understand it. The Europeans are moving quickly. So all of that is, I think, creating an environment where there might really be some progress.”

# 1NR

## Case

### 1NR---Framing

### 1NR---King Turn

### 1NR---Turn---Cap Good

### 1NR---!---War


### 1NR---Climate Change

### 1NR---!---Poverty


#### Global poverty and inequality are declining, leading to better wellbeing and health outcomes---prefer raw data, their evidence is narrative pessimism.

Will Koehrsen, 19, Will Koehrsen is a Data Scientist at Feature Labs, and a Data Science Communicator and Advocate. “The Disappearing Poor”, <https://towardsdatascience.com/the-disappearing-poor-6c68789e5a53>


How is it possible for people in a supposedly literate society like the US to be so wrong about reality? I don’t like to place blame, but in this case, it’s likely justified: the media has succeeded in a campaign to misinform us about the world. Instead of reporting facts, they have chosen to activate our natural inclination towards xenophobia (fear of outsiders) by convincing us there is a “developed world” with well-off people, and then there is everyone else, a mass of poor hordes that will never be able to rise from poverty. Fortunately, armed with the right data, we can correct our wrong beliefs about poverty. On doing so, we discoverable a remarkable fact: over the past few decades, people all over the world have undergone a remarkable increase in prosperity, resulting in measurably better living standards for billions of people. This is episode one of [the Reality Project,](https://medium.com/@williamkoehrsen/announcing-the-reality-project-e16cc71abb64) a weekly series dedicated to becoming less wrong about the world with data. The Facts about Global Poverty and Income First, we need to look at the statistics. The single best resource on this topic is the [Our World in Data “Global Extreme Poverty” page.](https://ourworldindata.org/extreme-poverty) You can view all the numbers there, but one chart suffices to show the drastic decline in poverty:



Global share of the world population in extreme poverty. We can see that the definition of poverty varies by institution, but no matter which definition we use, the rates have drastically increased. Sure, the rate is decreasing, but because there are more people, doesn’t that mean more people are still poor? Nice try nightly news, but the number of people living in poverty has also declined precipitously, by over 1.2 billion since 1990.



Number of people living in extreme poverty. Where do these people go as they rise from extreme poverty? Simple: into the global middle class. As of this writing, [about 85% of people in the world (6 billion out of 7 billion)](https://www.gatesnotes.com/Books/Factfulness?WT.mc_id=04_03_2018_10_Factfulness_BG-media_&WT.tsrc=BGmedia) are at or above the middle part of the global income scale. Making a distinction between “developed” and “developing” is the wrong way of looking at the world: there are not two income levels, but rather a smooth scale which people everywhere are rapidly climbing. We can observe the drastic increase in worldwide wealth in the numbers. As global poverty declines, incomes increase as shown in GDP per capita over time ([from the Our World in Data “Economic Growth” page](https://ourworldindata.org/economic-growth)): Gross Domestic Product Per Capita around the world. [CHART OMITTED] So, the facts are unequivocal that poverty is declining and incomes are increasing at an extremely rapid pace, but does this actually matter? It is possible that people are making more money but not having better lives? Why Wealth Matters: Rich Countries are Better Places to Live All of this may look nice, but you may be wondering if the rise in wealth actually means that people are better off. Well, based on the following chart showing life dissatisfaction vs GDP per capita, the answer is a resounding yes. Dissatisfaction in Living vs GDP [(Source)](https://ourworldindata.org/extreme-poverty) [CHART OMITTED] As wealth increases, people become more satisfied with life. Money is not a magical cure for all ills, and the [effects only persist up to a certain income level](https://www.visualcapitalist.com/relationship-money-happiness/) but wealth is positive because of the side effects it brings with it: lower infant mortality, more educational opportunities, and fewer working hours. It can be easy to lose sight of the humans in all the numbers so it’s critical to remember that behind every one of these data points is a person. Billions of people rising out of poverty means mothers who don’t have to bury their children because [care improves with wealth](https://ourworldindata.org/health-meta), girls who are able to attend high school, and families that are living healthier, happier lives. I’m not very good at talking about individual humans, but Hans Rosling provides stories (in addition to facts) in his excellent book Factfulness. As for me, I’ll end this section with another chart from Our World in Data which demonstrates why less poverty is positive: [CHART OMITTED] Average Number of Years of Schooling vs Poverty Levels The data could not be more clear: around the world, humans are rising out of poverty and into the middle class. As a consequence, they are living longer, going to school more, working less, and leading more enjoyable lives. Cause of the global decline in poverty There are likely many factors at play behind this decline (as with any human phenomenon) but I’ll focus on the most compelling argument: commerce. (For a full treatment of this subject, see Matt Ridley’s The Rational Optimist). For hundreds of thousands of years, humans engaged in zero-sum interactions: one person stole or killed another person, so someone’s gain was offset by someone else’s loss. In this system, the overall state of humanity could improve only glacially if at all ([new tools](https://www2.palomar.edu/anthro/homo/homo_4.htm) that raised living standards spread very slowly when communication was limited to walking speed). However, [beginning around 1000 AD in Europe](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/commercial-revolution-of-the-middle-ages-9501350/27C2AF7F2C913BADCDC29631B71EA7BF), a new form of interaction emerged: economic exchanges in which both parties came out better off. This invention, [known as commerce,](https://www.amazon.com/Great-Transformation-Political-Economic-Origins/dp/080705643X) completely changed the game: people were now able to enter into positive-sum exchanges where both parties gained. This is a fundamental building block of civilization: in commerce, both the person selling a good and the person buying a good come out ahead. For most of history, humanity had a constant amount of material wealth which could change hands but did not increase overall. With the invention of commerce, the size of the economic pie itself increases as people trade goods and specialize. Both within and between country exchanges lead to a [division of labor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Division_of_labour) wherein people or countries specialize in fulfilling one role, leading to [massive increases in efficiency](https://ourworldindata.org/trade-and-globalization). It took humans a long time to figure out, but once we created exchanges and market economies, we started on the incredible upward journey in wealth that continues to this day. We can see the beneficial effects of trade in recent years on the following chart. As countries trade more, they grow wealthier: [CHART OMITTED] Change in trade 1945–2014 versus change in wealth Don’t mistake me for a free-market evangelist. Before I began my efforts to get less wrong about the world through data, I was an avowed Socialist who upheld the Nordic countries as paragons to emulate. However, my exploration of the numbers has led to the conclusion that free markets and the exchange they enable are the [drivers for escaping poverty](https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/08/does-capitalism-cause-poverty/). I also still believe in the role of government: [tight government controls in areas like environmental protection](https://ourworldindata.org/air-pollution#dirty-then-clean-the-environmental-kuznets-curve-in-air-pollution) and worker rights are critical for making sure that increased wealth does not come at the cost of environmental devastation. The remarkable ability of commerce to lift people out of poverty can be seen in China, which over the past 40 years has undergone the most incredible wealth increase in history. As described in [How China Escaped the Poverty Trap](https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1501700200/ref=as_li_tf_til?tag=foreaffamaga-20&camp=0&creative=0&linkCode=as1&creativeASIN=1501700200), China’s extraordinary escape from poverty occurred as the communist leaders gradually opened the nation to commerce, crucially, trade with other nations. In 1978, China allowed foreign trade, and [in the 40 years since, has once again](https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/chinas-reform-and-opening-40-years-and-counting/) become a world power. Along the way, the living standards of hundreds of millions of people has been raised. [CHART OMITTED] China’s incredible rise in GDP per capita (Not only does commerce lead to rising income, but it also leads to decreasing rates of violence within and between nations. As documented by Steven Pinker in The Better Angels of Our Nature, when it is cheaper to buy something from someone than to steal it, economics wins out. Our neighbors become more valuable to us alive than dead which means less killing and more trading. This is known as the theory of gentle commerce.) Caveats While the long-term picture is overwhelmingly positive, it’s important to also focus on the realities that still need to be improved. At the moment, there are remain hundreds of millions of people in extreme poverty around the world and every one of these people deserves to rise into the middle class. The unfortunate reality is that the vast proportion of the world’s poor are in Africa where groups like the [United Nations are working to end poverty](https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/poverty/) through targeted spending programs and the institution of social safety nets. [CHART OMITTED] Where extreme poverty still exists ([source](https://www.visualcapitalist.com/decline-extreme-poverty-perspective/)) There are around 750 million people still in extreme poverty today. Nonetheless, considering 1.2 billion people moved out of extreme poverty from 1990–2015, there is every indication that extreme poverty can be ended. Furthermore, any time the issue of income is brought up, we have to mention income inequality. If countries are getting richer, but the wealth is going to fewer people, then is humanity really better off? Once again, it’s worth looking at the data, this time on inequality both within and between countries. We’ll turn to the Our World in Data articles “[Income Inequality”](https://ourworldindata.org/income-inequality) and [“Global Economic Inequality”](https://ourworldindata.org/global-economic-inequality) for the facts. Fortunately, the numbers again provide an optimistic answer. While within-country inequality has increased in a few countries, overall, global inequality has decreased and is projected to continue to decrease. From the following plot, we can see that some countries have experienced an increase in inequality within their borders if we define inequality as the share of total income going to the top 1%. (This definition [may have some issues](https://ourworldindata.org/income-inequality#within-country-inequality-in-rich-countries)). [CHART OMITTED] Share of income going to top 1% in selected nations. On the other hand, global economic inequality has declined:



Global income distribution showing decline in [Gini coefficient](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gini_coefficient). In summary, when looking at inequalities, the wealth distribution may be getting more skewed within some countries, but overall, because overall levels of wealth have increased most rapidly in the poorest nations, even those at the bottom of the income level are better off. I won’t go into the [debate about whether inequality](https://growthlab.cid.harvard.edu/news/what-should-we-do-about-inequality) is even negative, but, taking a long-term worldwide view of the situation, it does not appear to be worse now. Conclusions The news is not only misinforming you about the world but, by promoting a false picture, it’s stealing something valuable: the joy that comes with seeing the world is getting better. While it’s important to be realistic about the challenges we face in the short term, it’s also critical to take a look at the big picture and realize that all of our collective efforts are making a difference.

#### No consistent link between economic freedom and inequality---capitalism net alleviates poverty.

Lazear 20, \*Edward P. Lazear was the Morris Arnold and Nona Jean Cox Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Davies Family Professor of Economics at Stanford University's Graduate School of Business.;(May 26th, 2020, “Socialism, Capitalism, And Income”, https://www.hoover.org/research/socialism-capitalism-and-income-0)

First, there is no evidence that, as a general matter, high-income groups benefit more from a move toward capitalism than low-income groups. The effect of changing state ownership and economic freedom on income is not larger for the rich than for the poor. Second, income growth is positively correlated across deciles. The situation is closer to a rising tide lifting all boats than to the fat man becoming fat by making the thin man thin. Finally, there is no consistent evidence across the large number of countries and time periods examined of any strong and widespread link between income growth and inequality. There are examples, like China, where income growth was coupled with large increases in inequality, but others like Chile, where strong income growth came about without much change in inequality, and South Korea, where inequality declined slightly as economic freedom and income grew over time.

Transfers and redistribution present the most complex picture of state involvement.

Transfers from rich to poor through the tax system are a luxury that only rich countries seem to be able to afford and are not a product of socialism per se. There is a very high correlation (-.67 in 2010) between contemporaneous median income and the low transfer index across countries.

High transfer countries like those in Scandinavia and other rich parts of Europe have primarily private ownership and economic freedom more like what prevails in the United States than in socialist countries. The poor definitely—and unsurprisingly—seem to benefit from higher transfers at a point in time. But the high taxes that generally go along with transfers do result in low income growth for median and high-income groups within a given country over time.

A similar pattern exists with respect to rule of law. The contemporaneous relation of rule of law to income is strong, but this seems to reflect the fact that countries that are wealthy demand rule of law rather than the reverse. Low state ownership at a point in time is a more consistent predictor of income growth within a country over the following decade than is rule of law at that same point in time.

Finally, not all transitions are alike. The Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union saw large transitory declines in incomes for all groups during their transition to the market and the poor were more adversely affected than the rich. In China, and to a lesser extent India, market reforms brought about almost uninterrupted income growth. Venezuela provides an opposite example, moving from a more market-oriented economy to a socialist one.

Inequality fell slightly, but income growth was low for all groups and the poor have not regained the income levels that they had at the peak during the 1990s. The evidence suggests that it is economic shocks rather than transitions that disproportionately affect the poor. Transition from a command structure to the market is but one example of such a shock.

In sum, most income groups benefit from moves away from socialist command structures to free-market capitalism, but transfers can at least in the short run improve the well-being of those worst off.

### 1NR---Turn---Sustainability

### 1NR---AT: Unsustainable---Peak Farming

#### Agricultural inputs are decreasing, and outputs are increasing.

McAfee 19, \*Andrew Paul McAfee, a principal research scientist at MIT, is cofounder and codirector of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy at the MIT Sloan School of Management; (2019, “More from Less: The Surprising Story of How We Learned to Prosper Using Fewer Resources and What Happens Next”, https://b-ok.cc/book/5327561/8acdbe)

Agriculture. As we saw in chapter 5, leading farms have demonstrated an ability to increase their tonnage of output year after year while decreasing their use of inputs such as land, water, and fertilizer. This trend toward optimization will continue thanks to a set of innovations under the label precision agriculture. The precision comes from many sources, including better sensors of plant and animal health, soil quality and moisture, and so on; the ability to deliver fertilizer, pesticides, and water just where they’re needed; and machinery that adapts itself to each plant or animal. All these varieties of precision will combine to allow traditional farms to generate more from less.

So will changes to the genomes of plants and animals. DNA modifications will increase disease and drought tolerance, expand where crops can be grown, and allow us to get more of what we want from each crop or herd. As we saw in chapter 9, they’ll also allow us to take better care of vulnerable populations such as infants in poor countries by creating golden rice and other nutrition enhancers. We’ll also be able to make much more precise and targeted genetic modifications thanks to a new crop of gene-editing tools that are large improvements over their more scattershot predecessors. Opposition to genetically modified organisms is fierce in some quarters, but isn’t based on reason or science. This opposition will, one hopes, fade.

Throughout human history, just about all farming has been done in fields. For some crops, this is now changing. Agriculture has moved indoors, where parameters such as light, humidity, fertilizer, and even the composition of the atmosphere can be precisely monitored and controlled. In everything from urban buildings to shipping containers, crops are now being grown with progressively less labor and fewer material inputs. These completely contained farms will spread and help reduce the planetary footprint of our agriculture.

### 1NR---AT: Unsustainable---Peak Energy

#### Digitalization and renewables increase energy efficiency and enable cost-effective alternatives.

McAfee 19, \*Andrew Paul McAfee, a principal research scientist at MIT, is cofounder and codirector of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy at the MIT Sloan School of Management; (2019, “More from Less: The Surprising Story of How We Learned to Prosper Using Fewer Resources and What Happens Next”, https://b-ok.cc/book/5327561/8acdbe)

Energy. One of humanity’s most urgent tasks in the twenty-first century is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Two ways to do this are to become more efficient in using energy and, when generating it, to shift away from carbon-emitting fossil fuels. Digital tools will help greatly with both.

Several groups have recently shown that they can combine machine learning and other techniques to increase the energy efficiency of data centers by as much as 30 percent. This large improvement matters for two reasons. First, data centers are heavy users of energy, accounting for about 1 percent of global electricity demand. So efficiencies in these facilities help. Second, and more important, these gains indicate how much the energy use of all our other complicated infrastructures—everything from electricity grids to chemical plants to steel mills—can be trimmed. All are a great deal less energy efficient than they could be. We have both ample opportunity and ample incentive now to improve them.

Both wind and solar power are becoming much cheaper, so much so that in many parts of the world they’re now the most cost-effective options, even without government subsidies, for new electrical generators. These energy sources use virtually no resources once they’re up and running and generate no greenhouse gases; they’re among the world champions of dematerialization.

In the decades to come they might well be joined by nuclear fusion, the astonishingly powerful process that takes place inside the sun and other stars. Harnessing fusion has been tantalizingly out of reach for more than half a century—the old joke is that it’s twenty years away and always will be. A big part of the problem is that it’s hard to control the fusion reaction inside any human-made vessel, but massive improvements in sensors and computing power are boosting hope that fusion power might truly be only a generation away.

#### Capitalism *solves* and enhances biodiversity.

McAfee 19, \*Andrew Paul McAfee, a principal research scientist at MIT, is cofounder and codirector of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy at the MIT Sloan School of Management; (2019, “More from Less: The Surprising Story of How We Learned to Prosper Using Fewer Resources and What Happens Next”, https://b-ok.cc/book/5327561/8acdbe)

The State of Nature

Let’s first consider our impact on our planet and start with one of humanity’s greatest harms: causing other species to go extinct.

In addition to the passenger pigeon, we humans have entirely wiped out hundreds of other animal species. Our appetite for destruction has led some observers to warn that we’re facing a sixth “mass extinction” event, comparable to five previous episodes over the past 450 million years when at least half of all species on Earth vanished.

In an essay for the online magazine Aeon , however, Stewart Brand explained how implausible this is: “If all [currently threatened species] went extinct in the next few centuries, and the rate of extinction that killed them kept right on for hundreds or thousands of years more, then we might be at the beginning of a human-caused Sixth Mass Extinction.” However, Brand points out that documented extinctions are relatively rare (with about 530 recorded within the past five hundred years) and appear to have slowed down in recent decades; for example, no marine creatures have been recorded as extinct in the past fifty years.

The good news is that we humans are pushing back against our own tendencies toward annihilation in four main ways. First (and closest to science fiction), research is taking place on how to bring back extinct animals by making use of the DNA that remains in their corpses. Brand is a prominent exponent of this “de-extinction” movement and is working with the geneticist George Church and others to adapt an elephant into a species more akin to a woolly mammoth. II Second, we’re fighting to preserve some of the most threatened species living on islands (where a disproportionate number of extinctions take place) by removing imported predators. To date, at least eight hundred islands have been protected in this way.

Third, we humans have created a great many new species around the world. We do this both deliberately by crossbreeding, as with the cattle-bison hybrid “beefalo,” and inadvertently. Many animals have tagged along with us on our journeys around the world and have both speciated (evolved into new species) and hybridized (interbred with local creatures). Some people believe that, over the Industrial Era, our activities have led to a net gain in biological variety in many parts of the world. As the ecologist Chris Thomas puts it, “It appears to be empirically true that, over the last couple of hundred years, those parts of the world that we know about as regions have increased numbers of species.”

Brand argues, though, that the biggest threat to animal species isn’t absolute extinction, but instead huge declines in population size due to overhunting and habitat loss. Here, recent news is mixed. Overhunting continues, especially of marine life. As Jesse Ausubel points out, “ Fish biomass in intensively exploited fisheries appears to be about one-tenth the level of the fish in those seas a few decades… ago.”

Ocean overfishing is a classic example of the “tragedy of the commons,” an unhappy phenomenon named in a 1968 Science article by the ecologist Garrett Hardin. Hardin defined a commons as a shared resource, such as a pasture or a body of water, that is available to many but owned by none. That open access sounds great but has a big problem: everyone has ample incentive to exploit the commons (by grazing cows on the pasture or taking fish from the water), but because no one owns it, no one has the incentive to protect or sustain it. So the strong tendency is for everyone to do the economically rational thing, which is to try to exploit it before it’s stripped bare. As they do this, they help strip it bare. III

We have many ways to deal with the tragedy of the commons. Elinor Ostrom, to date the only woman to win the Nobel Prize in economics, developed principles for managing commons successfully. One of the most fruitful for helping severely depleted species, and the fourth way that we’re helping our fellow creatures survive and thrive, is to simply declare by law that large areas of land or water—large commons—can’t be exploited. As we saw in chapter 6, this is in large part how the conservation movement succeeded in protecting bison, beaver, and other species around the turn of the twentieth century. As we move deeper into the twenty-first century, this approach is quickly spreading around the world. Parks and other protected areas made up only 4 percent of global land area in 1985, but by 2015, this figure had almost quadrupled, to 15.4 percent. At the end of 2017, 5.3 percent of the earth’s oceans were similarly protected.

### 1NR---AT: Beller

#### 1 — Algorithmic governance is good ­and solves crisis escalation

Corneliu Bjola 19, Head of the Oxford Digital Diplomacy Research Group, University of Oxford, 11/10/19, “Diplomacy in the Age of Artificial Intelligence,” http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano\_en/contenido?WCM\_GLOBAL\_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano\_in/zonas\_in/ari98-2019-bjola-diplomacy-in-the-age-of-artificial-intelligence

Taking note of the fact that developments in AI are so dynamic and the implications so wide-ranging, another report prepared by a German think tank calls on Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) to immediately begin planning strategies that can respond effectively to the influence of AI in international affairs. Economic disruption, security & autonomous weapons, and democracy & ethics are the three areas they identify as priorities at the intersection of AI and foreign policy. Although they believe that transformational changes to diplomatic institutions will eventually be needed to meet the challenges ahead, they favour, in the short term, an incremental approach to AI that builds on the successes (and learns from the failures) of “cyber-foreign policy”, which, in many countries, has been already internalised in the culture of the relevant institutions, including of the MFAs.13 In the same vein, the authors of a report prepared for the Centre for a New American Security see great potential for AI in national security-related areas, including diplomacy. For example, AI can help improve communication between governments and foreign publics by lowering language barriers between countries, enhance the security of diplomatic missions via image recognition and information sorting technologies, and support international humanitarian operations by monitoring elections, assisting in peacekeeping operations, and ensuring that financial aid disbursements are not misused through anomaly detection.14

From an AI perspective, consular services could be a low-hanging fruit for AI integration in diplomacy as decisions are amenable to digitisation, the analytical contribution is reasonable relevant and the technology favours collaboration between users and the machine. Consular services rely on highly structured decisions, as they largely involve recurring and routinised operations based on clear and stable procedures, which do not need to be treated as new each time a decision has to be made (except for crisis situations, which are discussed further below). From a knowledge perspective, AI-assisted consular services may embody declarative (know-what) and procedural knowledge (know-how) to automate routinised operations and scaffold human cognition by reducing cognitive effort. This can be done by using data mining and data discovery techniques to organize the data and make it possible to identify patterns and relationships that would be difficult to observe otherwise (e.g., variation of demand for services by location, time, and audience profile).

Case study #1: AI as Digital Consul Assistant

The consulate of country X has been facing uneven demand for emergency passports, visa requests and business certifications in the past five years. The situation has led to a growing backlog, significant loss of public reputation and a tense relationship between the consulate and the MFA. An AI system trained with data from the past five years uses descriptive analytics to identify patterns in the applications and concludes that August, May and December are the most likely months to witness an increase of the demand in the three categories next year. AI predictions are confirmed for August and May but not for December. AI recalibrates its advice using updated data and the new predictions help consular officers manage requests more effectively. As the MFA confidence in the AI system grows, the digital assistant is then introduced to other consulates experiencing similar problems.

Digital platforms could also emerge as indispensable tools for managing diplomatic crises in the digital age and for good reasons. They can help embassies and MFAs make sense of the nature and gravity of the events in real-time, streamline the decision-making process, manage the public’s expectations, and facilitate crisis termination. At the same time, they need to be used with great care as factual inaccuracies, coordination gaps, mismatched disclosure level, and poor symbolic signalling could easily derail digital efforts of crisis management.15 AI systems could provide great assistance to diplomats in times of crisis by helping them make sense of what it is happening (descriptive analytics) and identify possible trends (predictive analytics). The main challenge for AI is the semi-structured nature of the decisions to be taken. While many MFAs have pre-designed plans to activate in case of a crisis, it is safe to assume that reality often defies the best crafted plans. Given the high level of uncertainty in which crisis decision-making operates and the inevitable scrutiny and demand of accountability to occur if something goes wrong, AI integration can work only if humans retain control over the process. As a recent SIPRI study pointed out, AI systems may fail spectacularly when confronted with tasks or environments that differ slightly to those they were trained for. Their algorithms are also opaque, which makes difficult for humans to explain how they work and whether they include bias that could lead to problematic –if not dangerous– behaviours.16

#### It prevents endless warfare.

James Andrew Lewis 18, senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, January 2018, “Rethinking Cybersecurity: Strategy, Mass Effect, and States,” https://espas.secure.europarl.europa.eu/orbis/sites/default/files/generated/document/en/180108\_Lewis\_ReconsideringCybersecurity\_Web.pdf, p. 16-17

Cyber Operations and Interstate Conflict

International relations are being reshaped by the confluence of several powerful trends, some created by new technologies, some by the powerful reaction to American hegemony, and some from the fraying of the international order created after 1945. In contrast to sunny millennial optimism, efforts to improve cybersecurity must be designed for a period where, for an unknown duration, there will be increased conflict as states challenge the liberal postwar order. We are at the end of a sustained period of strategic stability17 and conflict, albeit at low levels, will be the norm. Conflict between states will take new forms and cyber operations will be an important part of this. They are ideal for the new strategic environment, given their opacity, the lack of clear norms, and inadequate defenses.

Opponent actions that stay below this threshold inhabit a "gray area," that is neither peace nor war, where the United States and its allies, unable to use military force in response, have so far been stymied in designing and articulated an effective reply. Opponents will exploit gray areas in international law to coerce without triggering armed conflict. Deterrence will be more difficult in this opaque environment, and we will see increased use by our opponents of coercive acts that fall below thresholds for the use of force or armed attack.

The future of armed conflict is that major powers will try to avoid armed confrontation. Wars between big, heavily armed states are expensive and risky, particularly if they have nuclear weapons. The major powers will not renounce the use of force and coercion—Russia, the United States, China, Iran, North Korea, and others use force or the threat of force all the time— but they will try to avoid war with each other. If major powers do stumble into conventional war, cyber attacks will be a part of the fighting, but the real nature of cyber conflict involves something other than warfare and lacks the sharp discontinuity between war and peace. The experience of the last decade suggests that the norm for interstate conflict will be increasingly continuous and not kinetic.

#### 2 — Data combats racial biases

John Zerilli 18, Professor of law and philosophy at the University of Sydney, with; Alistair Knott, James Maclaurin, and Colin Gavaghan; 9/5/18, “Transparency in Algorithmic and Human Decision-Making: Is There a Double Standard?” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13347-018-0330-6#Sec4

Human bias is often intrinsic, in the above sense, because it bears an important relation to emotion, itself a constitutive feature of personality (Angie et al. 2011; Pohl 2008; Stephan and Finlay 1999). Racial bias is a good example of intrinsic bias in human beings, because the connection with emotion is relatively clear (the emotion being fear), as is its tolerance to falsifying evidence. When someone has been conditioned to believe that an ethnic minority poses a threat to safety, or is more susceptible to crime, merely supplying that person with evidence to the contrary may be insufficient to dislodge a lifetime of encrusted prejudice (Bezrukova et al. 2016). Racist conditioning may permanently (or semipermanently) affect the way a person processes information and makes decisions. Of course this is not to say that intrinsic bias is always irrational. Many human biases could be thought to result from the misfiring of an ancient and conserved cognitive adaptation to make generic judgements (Begby 2013; Leslie 2017). Because such judgements are based on dispositional rather than probabilistic factors, they too tend to be resistant to disconfirming evidence.

As against intrinsic bias, bias that is not intrinsic (i.e. extrinsic) derives from a system’s inputs when they do not effect a permanent change in the system’s internal structure and rules of operation. In these cases, false information may affect a system’s outputs, but so long as the information is corrected, the outputs will be unbiased pro tanto. Thus, if a person is given information that leads them to the erroneous belief that p, and the belief that p plays a relevant role in decision-making, leading to the decision that q, the person will be nonintrinsically biased towards the decision that q if, upon receiving the correct information, the person no longer believes that p, and either abandons or revises the grounds for the decision that q.

Overall, while it is true that an algorithm can be intrinsically biased (see below), nonintrinsic bias is probably the bigger issue for AI (Friedman and Nissenbaum 1996; Johnson 2006). The so-called dirty data problem is a neat illustration. Errors and biases latent in data training sets tend to be reproduced in the outputs of machine learning tools (Barocas and Selbst 2015; Diakopoulos 2015). This is a significant problem, and one that is compounded—of all things—by copyright and intellectual property laws, which presently limit the access users have to better quality training data (Levendowski 2017).Footnote9 But nonintrinsic bias is still in principle less difficult to overcome than intrinsic bias. Most of these problems arise from the use of unrepresentative data sets. For instance, face recognition systems trained predominantly on Caucasian faces might reject the passport application photos of Asian persons, whose eyes appear closed (Griffiths 2016). Speech recognition systems, too, are notorious for being less accurate when decoding female voices than male ones (Tatman 2016). Both situations arise from a failure to include members of diverse social groups in training data. The obvious solution is to diversify the training sets (Klingele 2016; Crawford and Calo 2016). While there are political and legal barriers in the way of this, as Levendowski (2017) documents in her careful analysis of intellectual property laws, it is not nearly as intractable a problem as the one posed by intrinsic human bias (Bezrukova et al. 2016; Plous 2003a; Allport 1954).

**Communication and meaning are possible and desirable – framing speech as pure flux destroys any benefits gained from intersubjective processes of meaning in specific political contexts**

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(Fasil, Addis Ababa University, Master’s Thesis in Philosophy, “Habermas and the Discourse of Modernity,” http://etd.aau.edu.et/bitstream/123456789/3596/3/FASIL%20MERAWI.pdf)

As Culler sees it, Derrida raised three main objections towards Searle’s speech act theory. First, any speech act can be quoted and be analyzed in another context and the idea that meaning will be the same in another context, is something fictional. Habermas criticized Derrida for failing to recognize that what Austin meant by the fixation of meaning in everyday communication and the normal use of language, is based on idealizing presuppositions that are present in every communicative action (PDM, 195-196). Second, Derrida argued that, for a normal speech act to be successfully employed, meaning needs to be arrested, and this to be done by presenting general rules and conditions under which a given utterance is to be employed and analyzed. But speech acts can have different meanings depending on the contexts. Here, Derrida speaks of ‘grafting’ i.e. that a speech act can be quoted in another context. So, the contexts are infinite and one cannot come up with a theory of the employment of speech acts specifying where and how they should be employed since meaning is contextual, and the contexts are many. Here, culler supports Derrida’s argument by claiming that even the “intentions of the speakers...are to be interpreted in different contexts.” (PDM, 197) Searle objected to Derrida’s second argument, by asserting that, what prevents flux and fluctuation of meaning is not found in what is uttered, but the general assumptions in which it is uttered. So, when using speech acts on a day to day level, participants are operating within a set of assumptions that define what something normally means and does not mean. Further, the assumptions within which speech acts occur, **are not** theoretical **constructs** that are **built to arrest meaning**, but **necessary assumptions behind the process of communication**. Finally, Derrida, against Searle argued that, it is the potential of the text to be interpreted in many ways and not our intentions and assumptions that make different interpretations possible. So, the text by itself plays a context creating function. As Habermas sees it, as long as participants in an intersubjectivist communicative process are oriented towards understanding, then meaning will not be deferred. **Wrong interpretations** and abnormal usages of language **could be** simply **identified** as something that hinders consensus and understanding. Idealizations that are found beyond communicative action and the fact that the various claims raised during communication are open to critique, and can be empirically tested will easily help to “distinguish between ‘usual’ and ‘parasitic’ uses of language” (PDM, 199). By ‘parasitic’, Habermas meant that the normal use of language in everyday communication is for reaching understanding. Other artistic, metaphorical and non-literal usages of language are derived from the normal usage. Further, eventhough ‘parasitic’ usages of language prevail in everyday communication; still actors are able to bypass these usages since they are oriented towards reaching understanding. By revising the Derrida/Searle debate and employing his arguments as well, Habermas believes that, he managed to defend his communicative rationality with its validity claims. In everyday communication the infinite flow of meaning, poetic and rhetoric elements are **put**s **aside for the sake of understanding**. Having done this, Habermas wants to refute the idea that there is no distinction between logic and rhetoric and that all texts can be analyzed on literary and rhetorical terms. The issue as, Habermas sees it, is the acceptance that all language contains literary and rhetorical elements, while at the same time defending philosophy and the special forms of inquiry against the domination of literary elements, and hence the viewing of their validity claims as something impure and contaminated with artistic and metaphorical elements. Habermas, claims that Derrida’s general notion of text as a mixture of Heterogeneous elements, makes him blind to the fact that in everyday communication there is the possibility to raise and defend claims in **reference to** the three **validity** claims, and that the various specialized forms of inquiry are also oriented towards **solving specific problems** (PDM, 205). Habermas thinks that there is an affinity between Rorty and Derrida in relation to their views on language, communicating subjects. In Rorty, the languages of the sciences and other forms of inquiries create the contexts that necessarily determine everyday communication. Further, the capacity of validity claims to challenged inherited horizons is unacknowledged. (PDM, 206) Furthermore, both Derrida and Rorty, failed to distinguish between everyday interaction in which distinct validity claims are raised, and the various forms of inquiry that are geared toward solving specific problems (PDM, 207). Derrida is accused by Habermas of failing to distinguish between how language has a capacity of making the world visible and intelligible and how it can be used to solve specific problems. So, Derrida in his general notion of a ‘text’ tried to merge all the sciences, including philosophy, criticism, art, literature and so on under one category of literature. Habermas claims that on the one hand, we have everyday world of communication based in the different validity claims, while on the other, the various specialized forms of inquiry that are geared at solving specific problems. Philosophy and literary criticism are found between the two. Literary criticism connects everyday world and the artistic realm, while philosophy, is related to the forms of inquiries in having a universalistic dimension. Philosophy facilitates disputation of claims between everyday world and specialized inquiries. (PDM, 207-208)